Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 8 | Issue 2

Article 2

1991

Inherently Discriminatory Conduct Revisited: Do
We Know It When We See It?
Barbara J. Fick

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Fick, Barbara J. (1991) "Inherently Discriminatory Conduct Revisited: Do We Know It When We See It?," Hofstra Labor and
Employment Law Journal: Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/2

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.
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INHERENTLY DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT
REVISITED: DO WE KNOW IT WHEN WE
SEE IT?
BarbaraJ. Fick*

Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA or the Act) prohibits an employer from discriminating

"in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor

organization." 1 Proving a violation of this section generally requires
evidence that an employer has treated an employee differently in regard to hiring or conditions of employment, and that the different
treatment was motivated by an intent to encourage or discourage
union membership.2 The employer's motive for engaging in the differential treatment is a central issue in most 8(a)(3) cases. 3
In some circumstances, however, the employer's conduct speaks
for itself. "Thus an employer's protestation that he did not intend to
encourage or discourage must be unavailing where a natural consequence of his action was such encouragement or discouragement." 4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. J.D., University
of Pennsylvania, 1976; B.A., Creighton University, 1972.
1. 29 U.S.C §158(a)(3)(1982), provides, in pertinent part, that "it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ... "
2. The term "union membership" as used in the statute has been broadly defined to
include not only the act of becoming and remaining a union member, but also the type of
union member an individual is, i.e. whether an individual is a good or bad member or whether
an individual engages in union activities. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40
(1954). As used in this article, the term union membership includes all of the above activities.
3. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965):
Under the words of the statute [§8(a)(3)] there must be both discrimination and a
resulting discouragement of union membership. It has long been established that a
finding of violation under this section will normally turn on the employer's motivation. . . . Thus when the employer discharges a union leader who has broken shop
rules, the problem posed is to determine whether the employer has acted purely in
disinterested defense of shop discipline or has sought to damage employee
organization.
4. Radio Officers', 347 U.S. at 45.
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The employer is held to have intended the naturally foreseeable consequences of its conduct. The act itself establishes motive; a labor
law version of res ipsa loquitur. This concept has been labeled "inherently discriminatory conduct." 5
As a matter of proof, therefore, violations of §8(a)(3) are easier
to prove in cases involving inherently discriminatory conduct. Once it
is proven that the employer engaged in inherently discriminatory
conduct, the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter the
Board) can find a violation of §8(a)(3) without the need of a separate finding related to the employer's motive.' Where inherently discriminatory conduct is not present, finding a violation of §8(a)(3) is
dependent upon proof that the employer engaged in discriminatory
conduct and that its purpose in doing so was to encourage or discourage union membership. 7 Thus, a determination that an employer's conduct falls within the inherently discriminatory doctrine
can be dispositive of the issue of whether §8(a)(3) has been
violated. 8
While the Supreme Court has developed this doctrine, it has not
precisely defined its contours, leaving the Board, the Courts of Appeal, and even the Supreme Court itself to struggle with the applicability of the doctrine to specific employer conduct on a case-by-case
basis. One is often left with the feeling that attempts to define inherently discriminatory conduct, like attempts to define obscenity, may
never be completely successful, but that experienced labor lawyers
5. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., (discussing inherently discriminatory conduct). 373
U.S. 221, 228 (1963). Because Erie Resistor uses both the term destructive as well as discriminatory in describing employer conduct, some courts and commentators refer to this as "inherently destructive" conduct. As will be shown, however, inherently destructive conduct is a subset of the inherently discriminatory doctrine.
6. See generally Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221 (wherein such a finding was made).
7. Id.
8. It is this determination which forms the basis for the differing results reached by the
Board majority and dissent in HarterEquip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1984), affd sub nom,
Local 825, Int'l Union of OperatingEng'rs v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987). The majority concluded that the employer's conduct, while inherently discriminatory, did not rise to the
level of inherently destructive; therefore, in view of the failure to prove an anti-union motive in
the face of evidence of legitimate and substantial business justification for the conduct, the
employer did not violate §8(a)(3). 280 N.L.R.B. at 599. The dissent, on the other hand, found
the employer's conduct both inherently discriminatory and destructive and thus in violation of
§8(a)(3). Id. at 603-04; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fedn of Flight
Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). In this case, decided under the Railway Labor Act, the
majority rejected the attempt to label the employer's conduct inherently destructive and found
no violation of the statute. 489 U.S. at Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent, would have
found a violation based on their characterization of the employer's conduct as inherently destructive. Id.
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know it when they see it." Nevertheless, this article will trace the
development of the doctrine, propose some guidelines for determininherently
ing when employer conduct falls under the rubric of the
° dealing with
cases
recent
two
analyze
and
doctrine,
discriminatory
employer use of temporary replacements during offensive lockouts in
light of the proposed guidelines.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INHERENTLY DISCRIMINATORY

DOCTRINE

In the first case decided by the Supreme Court under the newlyenacted NLRA," the Court was faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute on many fronts, one of which was the
employer's assertion that the Board's reinstatement and backpay order, issued as a result of finding a violation of §8(a)(3) ,12 "constitutes an unlawful interference with the right of the [employer] to
3
manage its own business."' The Court rejected this argument,
noting:
The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of
the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its
employees with respect to their self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its
authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge
when that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion. The true purpose is the subject of
investigation ....11
Thus, from the outset, the importance of motive to finding a viola5
tion of §8(a)(3) was established.'
9.

Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing

10.

Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1984), afid. sub nom. Local 825, Int'l

that Justice Stewart states he would know when he saw it).

Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987); Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers

v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
11. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
of the
12. Section 8(3) of the NLRA as enacted in 1935 was the predecessor to §8(a)(3)
to
Act as amended. The wording relating to the prohibition of discrimination in employment

discourage union membership was not changed.
13.

14.

Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 20 (summarizing argument of respondent-employer).

Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added); see also Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.

backNLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 682-84 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing the legislative

ground of §8(a)(3)).

of
15. See generally Christensen and Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission
1269
L.J.
YALE
77
Formality,
Fictive
the
and
Court
Supreme
The
Unfair Labor Practices:

L. Rav. 1
(1968); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 HARv.
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Direct evidence of the employer's motive is seldom available,
however. Rare is the employer who admits, "Yes, I fired you because
you joined the union." The more usual circumstance involves the employer who asserts a legitimate business reason for its conduct. Case
law thus developed types of indirect evidence from which a trier of
fact could infer an employer's motive."" Examples of such indirect
evidence are: condonation,' 7 comparative treatment, 8 departure
from routine 9 or false 20 or inconsistent 2 ' explanations.
(1947); Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee
Choice, 32 U. Cm. L. Rv. 735 (1965); Oberer, The Scienter Factorin Sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing,Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 491
(1967) (discussing the meaning and role of motive in §8(a)(3)).
16. See, e.g., McGraw-Edison Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 67, 75 (8th Cir. 1969). "The
Board, of course, may base its finding on circumstantial as well as on direct evidence." 419
F.2d at 75. "Intent and motive are subjective and often may be proved only by circumstantial
evidence." Id.
17. The classic case relying on condonation for proof of motive is Edward G. Budd Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943). The work history of the discriminatee, Walter
Weigand, revealed that he reported to work drunk, arrived at and left work as he pleased,
brought a woman (known as the Duchess) to work and "introduced" her to several of the
workers, and punched the time cards for other workers. Id. at 90. Management was aware of
Weigand's conduct; not only did they refuse requests by his supervisor to fire him, but they
gave him five raises. Within two days of management's discovery that Weigand was involved
with the CIO, however, he was fired. The court refused to credit the employer's assertion that
the discharge was motivated by the accumulation of unacceptable behavior on Weigand's part.
Rather, the court found that his unacceptable behavior had been condoned. Id. Based on the
employer's knowledge of Weigand's CIO activities, the timing of the discharge in relation to
the employer's knowledge, and the employer's condonation of the stated reason for discharge,
the court held that the Board could decide that the employer's real motive was to discourage
activity on behalf of the CIO. Id. at 90-91.
18. See, e.g., Mikami Bros., 188 N.L.R.B. 522 (1971). The employer in Mikami Bros.,
claimed it discharged the discriminatee because her paycheck had been subjected to garnishment on two occasions. Id. at 525. Another employee, however, who had also suffered two
garnishments only one month previous, had not been discharged. Id. at 526. The administrative law judge concluded that the employer's "reason for the discharge does not withstand
scrutiny when compared with its much laxer treatment of an equal offender. . .." Id.
19. See, e.g., Tendico, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 735 (1977). The employer in Tendico, Inc.,
maintained a progressive system of discipline but discharged the discriminatee, allegedly for
poor work performance, without any prior warning or discipline. Id. at 747-46. The administrative law judge noted that the employer's "sudden decision to discipline [the discriminatee]
with the ultimate discipline of discharge without prior written warning and a disciplinary layoff of 3 working days as prescribed by its normal practice became inexplicable unless one
considers some other reason or motivation." Id. at 748.
20. See, e.g., Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966). The
employer in Shattuck challenged the Board's finding of an 8(a)(3) violation, claiming that it
discharged the discriminatee for failure to obey his supervisor's orders. Id. at 468. The court
found there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the employee did not in fact
refuse to obey the order. In enforcing the Board's finding of a violation, the court held:
Actual motive, a state of mind, being the question, it is seldom that direct evidence
will be available that is not also self-serving. In such cases, the self-serving declaration is not conclusive; the trier of fact may infer motive from the total circumstances
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals developed another method

for inferring an employer's illegal motive, finding that in some circumstances the employer's conduct in and of itself can create such

an inference, based on the theory that the employer intends the nat-

ural result of its conduct.22 Other courts of appeals rejected this
method, requiring evidence specifically directed to the issue of

the employer intended its conduct to discourage union activwhether
23
ity.

The Supreme Court was called upon to resolve this circuit con-

24
flict in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB. The question presented, as
framed by the union in its petition for certiorari, was "[m] ay a finding that discrimination was practiced for the purpose of 'encourage
membership' be predicated upon an assumption that discriminatory
25

conduct constitutes 'inherent' encouragement of membership?

proved.. . If he finds that the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly
can infer that there is another motive. More than that, he can infer that the motive
is one that the employer desires to conceal - an unlawful motive ...
Id. at 470.
21. See, e.g., Rockingham Sleepwear, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 472 (1971), enforced per
curiam 81 LRRM 2132 (4th Cir. 1972). Here, the employer initially claimed the discriminatee had quit. 190 N.L.R.B. at 473. Subsequently, the employer told the state unemployment compensation agency that the discriminatee was laid off for poor attendance. Lastly,
the employer stated that the discriminatee's poor attitude had caused her not to be recalled.
Id. The administrative law judge found a violation of §8(a)(3) noting that "the inference to be
drawn from these sham and shifting explanations is that [the employer] discharged and reId. at
fused to reinstate [the discriminatee] in reprisal for her espousing the [u]nion.
475.
22. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 23.
23. Id.
24. 347 U.S. 17 (1954). This case actually consists of three separate cases, each of
which raised issues regarding the interpretation of §8(a)(3). In Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 196 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 344 U.S. 852 (1952), and NLRB v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 196 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 344 U.S. 853 (1952), two issues
were raised: (1) must there be express proof that employer discrimination actually had the
effect of discouraging union membership or is it sufficient to show that employer discrimination could reasonably have the tendency to discourage union membership and that such tendency can be inferred from the discriminatory act; and (2) is the phrase "membership in any
labor organization" to be narrowly construed as covering only the acts of joining a union or
remaining a member or should it be more broadly construed as including the obligations and
activities attendant upon union membership. Radio Officers and NLRB v. Gaynor News Co.,
197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 902 (1953), raised the issue of interest in
the present discussion: whether a finding of intent to encourage or discourage union membership can be inferred from the discriminatory act itself.
25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and Supporting Brief at 7, Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954)(No. 5).
As formulated by the employer in Gaynor News, the question was "[c]an an employer be held
guilty of an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(3). . .where there is no evidence to indicate that the acts complained of encouraged or discouraged such membership, or that that was
their purpose?" Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and Supporting Brief at 5, Gaynor News Co. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954)
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In resolving this conflict, the Court reaffirmed the necessity for
proving motive,2 a but held that evidence specifically directed to the
issue of intent is not the sole method for proving that issue.27 The
Court sanctioned the use of the "common law rule that a man is
held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct", stating
that:
Thus an employer's protestation that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be unavailing where a natural consequence of his action was such encouragement or discouragement.
Concluding that encouragement or discouragement will result, it is
presumed that he intended such consequence. In such circumstances intent to encourage is sufficiently established.28
The Court then described how'this principle was applied to the
employer's conduct in Gaynor News v. NLRB.2" The initial contract
between the union and the employer applied only to union members
working in the delivery department.3 ° The delivery department employed both union and nonunion workers. The nonunion workers
were unable to join the union as the union admitted to membership
only first-born legitimate sons of current members. When the contract expired, the parties executed an interim agreement providing
that any wage increase negotiated in the new contract would be retroactively paid to the parties covered by the expired agreement. A
new contract was subsequently executed which recognized the union
as the exclusive representative for all delivery department employees
and granted wage and benefit increases. The employer thereafter
paid retroactive wage and vacation benefits to union members only.
The employer argued that the discrimination in wage payment did
not violate §8(a)(3) because it was only contractually bound to pay
retroactive increases to the union members who had been covered by
the previous agreement and it was merely making an economic business decision not to spend more than necessary. 31 The Court found
that it was proper to apply the principle that the employer is held to
(No. 7).
26. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 42-44. The Court remarked that "[the relevance of the
motivation of the employer in such discrimination has been consistently recognized. . . ...
Id.
at 43.
27. Id. at 44-45.
28. Id. at 45.
29. Id. at 46-48 (discussing Gaynor News v NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954)).
30. Id. at 36 n.33.
31. Id. at 36. The employer also argued it could not have intended to encourage the
nonunion members to join the union because under union policies these employees were not
eligible for membership. Id.; see also Gaynor News Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 299, 311-13 (1951).
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intend the naturally foreseeable consequences of its acts. Discrimination based solely on union membership with respect to payment of
32
wages was "inherently conducive to increased union membership."
It was obvious that employees, who saw that wages were tied to
union membership, would be encouraged to join a union as to "obviate the need for any other proof of intent. .... ,,33
Thus, where the employer's conduct on its face is based solely
on union membership or activity, an inference may be drawn that
the employer's motive in so acting is also based on union membership. In other words, conduct which is inherently discriminatory carries its own indicia of intent.
For example, where an employer discharges a union member
claiming that the reason is absenteeism, the employer's act is not
inherently discriminatory. The basis for the difference in treatment,
on its face, is attendance. The employer's motive, as derived from
the foreseeable consequences of its conduct, could be to encourage
attendance at work rather than to discourage union membership.
Thus, the employer's motive must be proved by specific evidence directed to this issue, (e.g. had the employer condoned the employee's
absenteeism, or had other employees with similar absentee records
not been discharged) .34 On the other hand, when the employer takes
a work-related action (such as making retroactive wage payments),
and the sole basis for determining which employees will be subject to
that action is union membership, the conduct is inherently discriminatory. From the face of the employer's action it is handing out a
benefit, or imposing a punishment, based on the union status of its
employees. Such action will obviously cause employees to evaluate
union membership in light of the benefit or punishment attached
thereto, and it can be inferred that the employer intended that evaluation (i.e. encouragement or discouragement of union membership)
to occur.
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Radio Officers was directed primarily at clarifying the role which an employer's inher35
ently discriminatory conduct plays in establishing motive. He made
32. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 46.
33. Id. As for the claim that the conduct could not have encouraged employees to join
the union because they were ineligible for membership, the Court determined that actual encouragement need not be shown so long as it is reasonable to infer that the conduct in question
has a tendency to encourage union membership. Id. at 48.
34. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing cases that developed indirect evidence from which a trier of fact could infer an employer's motive).
35. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 55-57 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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it clear that such conduct raises an inference only,3 8 which may or
may not be drawn based on other evidence presented in the case. In
some cases, the defense proffered by the employer to justify its inherently discriminatory conduct may be sufficiently compelling as to undermine the reasonableness of drawing an inference that the employer's motive was an illegal one.3 7 Under such circumstances, if
the Board were to draw an inference of illegal motive, a reviewing
court should overturn the finding as not being supported by substantial evidence when viewing the record as a whole.3 8 In other cases,
the inference drawn from the employer's inherently discriminatory
conduct would be sufficient, by itself, to support a finding of illegal
motive.3 9
The Board attempted to apply the common law foreseeability
rule sanctioned by Radio Officers to situations involving exclusive
hiring halls.4 ° In Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated Gen36. An inference is to be distinguished from a presumption. A fact or series of facts
from which a trier of fact may draw a certain conclusion creates an inference; when the trier

of fact must draw the conclusion, a presumption is created.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

778,

1185 (5th ed. 1979).
37. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 55-57.
38. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-89 (1951)(setting forth
the standard of review for courts of appeal in Board decisions).
39. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 56-57 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
explained that:
In many cases a conclusion by the Board that the employer's acts are likely to help
or hurt a union will be so compelling that a further and separate finding characterizing the employer's state of mind would be an unnecessary and fictive formality. In
such a case the employer may fairly be judged by his acts and the inferences to be
drawn from them.
Of course, there will be cases in which the circumstances under which the employer acted serve to rebut any inference that might be drawn from his acts of
alleged discrimination standing alone. For example, concededly a raise given only to
union members is prima facie suspect; but the employer, by introducing other facts,
may be able to show that the raise was so patently referable to other considerations,
unrelated to his views on unions and within his allowable freedom of action, that the
Board could not reasonably have concluded that his conduct would encourage or
discourage union membership.
In sum, any inference that may be drawn from the employer's alleged discriminatory acts is just one element of evidence which may or may not be sufficient,
without more, to show a violation. But that should not obscure the fact that this
inference may be bolstered or rebutted by other evidence which may be adduced,
and which the Board must take into consideration. The Board's task is to weigh
everything before it, including those inferences which, with its specialized experience, it believes can fairly be drawn. On the basis of this process, it must determine
whether the alleged discriminatory acts of the employer were such that he should
have reasonably anticipated that they would encourage or discourage union
membership.

Id.
40.

An exclusive hiring hall is an arrangement between an employer and a union requir-
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eral Contractors, Inc.,4" the Board found that the practical effect of
giving the union control over employment referrals was to encourage
individuals seeking employment to be subservient to the union, either
by becoming members or participating in union activities. 42 Citing to
Radio Officers, the Board found that exclusive hiring halls inherently encourage union membership, thus allowing the Board to draw
the inference that the employer intended the foreseeable consequences of this arrangement.43
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the Board's
analysis and application of Radio Officers in exclusive hiring hall
situations in Local 357, InternationalBrotherhood. of Teamsters v.
NLRB.44 The flaw in the Board's analysis was the lack of a finding
that the employer's conduct was inherently discriminatory, such a
finding being the necessary prerequisite to application of the inherently discriminatory doctrine. In the exclusive hiring hall situation
presented in Local 357, the arrangement specifically provided that
individuals would be referred by the union regardless of whether or
not they were union members.45
The Act does not prohibit encouragement or discouragement of
union activity per se.46 The fact that certain employer conduct may
encourage individuals to join a union is not sufficient to find a violation of §8(a)(3). When, as a result of collective bargaining with a
union, the employer grants the employees in the bargaining unit a
raise, it is likely that some of these employees will be encouraged to
47
participate in the union as a result of receiving this benefit. But
encouragement alone is not unlawful; only that which is accomplished by discrimination is illegal.48 When the employer decides to
give the negotiated wage increase only to employees who are union
ing the employer to consider and hire only those applicants referred by the union; it prohibits

the employer from accepting applicants from any other source. See Fick, Political Abuse of

Hiring Halls: Comparative Treatment Under the NLRA and the LMRDA, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J.

339, 344
41.
42.
43.

(1987).
119 N.L.R.B. 883, 895 (1957).
Id. at 895.
Id. at 895.

44. 365 U.S. 667 (1961). This case did not directly review the Mountain Pacific case.
The underlying case on review was Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B.
1629 (1958), enforced in part, 275 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1960) involving a finding that an

exclusive hiring hall violated §8(a)(3) of the NLRA based on the rationale enunciated in
Mountain Pacific.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Local 357, Teamsters, 365 at 668.
Id. at 674-75 (quoting Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 42-43).
Id. at 675.
Id. at 676.
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members, then both discrimination and encouragement are present
and the employer's conduct is illegal. Thus, even though the existence of the exclusive hiring hall encourages union membership, the
lack of any evidence of discriminatory conduct negates a finding of a
§8(a)(3) violation.49
Local 357 emphasized that the conduct in question must be inherently discriminatory before the common law foreseeability rule is
applied. 50 On its face the conduct must distinguish between those
who are union members and those who are not, or between those
who participate in certain union activities and those who do not.
Having shown that the conduct in question is inherently discriminatory and that such conduct has the practical foreseeable effect of
encouraging or discouraging union membership, then the inference
may be drawn that the employer's motive in engaging in the conduct
was for the purpose of such encouragement or discouragement and a
violation of §8(a)(3) may be found. Merely showing that employer
conduct tends to encourage union membership without a showing
that such conduct is inherently discriminatory will not support an
application of the inherently discriminatory doctrine.
The Board next attempted to apply the inherently discriminatory doctrine in Erie Resistor Corp.,51 a case involving an employer
grant of superseniority to nonstrikers; this time it was successful. 2
The facts of the Erie Resistor case, as found by the administrative
law judge, are as follows:
When the union and employer were unable to reach an agreement upon expiration of their old contract, the union went on
strike.53 The employer attempted to maintain production by using
non-unit employees, but was only able to attain 20-30% of its prestrike production levels.5 4 This was inadequate to meet customer demand, so the employer began hiring replacement workers. Although
the employer gave the replacements assurances that they would not
be laid off or discharged when the strike ended, it was unable to
secure sufficient workers to meet production demands. The employer,
therefore, devised a twenty year superseniority plan 55 in order to at49. Id. at 674-76.
50. See id at 675.
51. 132 N.L.R.B. 621 (1961), enforcement denied sub nom, International Union of
Elec. Workers, Local 613 v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1962), revd, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
52. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
53. 132 N.L.R.B. at 639.
54. Id.
55. The twenty year number was calculated as the amount of seniority necessary to
insure that replacement workers would not be laid off in future business recessions. Id. at 627
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tract replacement workers. Within ten days of the posting of the
plan, the strike collapsed and those strikers who had not been replaced were reinstated. Subsequently, when layoffs became necessary, reinstated strikers, who otherwise would have been retained,
were laid off due to the operation of the superseniority plan. The
union challenged the plan as violative of §8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the
Act. 6
The administrative law judge held that motive was the central
issue in determining the legality of the employer's conduct, and that
the General Counsel had failed to prove an illegal motive. Indeed,
the facts showed that the employer adopted the plan for legitimate,
economic reasons.58 The employer did not immediately replace the
strikers, but did so only after its attempts to maintain production
with non-unit employees proved unavailing. Its initial attempts to secure replacements did not include an offer of superseniority; it was
only when it became evident that assurance of permanent status was
not sufficient to enlist replacements that it devised the superseniority
plan. Toward the end of the strike, the employer had enough applifrom doing so becations to replace all the strikers but it refrained
59
union.
the
break
to
cause it did not want
While the Board agreed with the administrative law judge's factual findings, 6 0 it disagreed with his legal conclusions and found a
violation of §8(a)(3).61 Citing to Radio Officers, the Board held that
the employer's conduct in this case spoke for itself and obviated any
necessity for specific proof that the employer intended to discourage
union membership.6 2 Specifically, the Board stated that:
Respondent's superseniority policy - on its face discriminatory
against those who continued to strike - clearly discouraged strike
activities and union membership of employees. Such was the inevitable result of a preference granted for all time to those who did
not join the Union's strike activities. Where discrimination is so
patent, and its consequences so inescapable and demonstrable, we
do not think the General Counsel need prove that Respondent subn. 20. It was based on a projection of the number of employees on layoff and future business
needs. Superseniority could be used only for layoff purposes, not for other types of employment
benefits. Id. at 622-23.
56. Id. at 638.
57. Id at 645-46.
58. Id. at 647.
59. Id. at 645-47.
60. Id. at 621.
61. Id. at 630-31.
62. Id. at 629-30.
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jectively "intended" such a result.6 3
The Board did not ignore the defense proffered by the employer
in seeking to justify its conduct. 64 As noted by Frankfurter in his
concurrence in Radio Officers, such evidence may be sufficient to
overcome the inference of illegal motive to be drawn from the inherently discriminatory conduct and its foreseeable consequences.6 5 The
Board found, however, that with the type of conduct and its attendant consequences present in this case, the employer could not justify
its acts even if motivated by business necessity. "To excuse such conduct would greatly diminish, if not destroy, the right to strike guaranteed by the Act, and would run directly counter to the guarantees
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) that employees shall not be discriminated
against for engaging in protected concerted activities."6 " The Board
suggested that there are some types of inherently discriminatory conduct whose effects are so pernicious that the employer can be found
to have intended those effects even in the face of evidence that its
motive was a legitimate one. This analysis would seem to run
counter to the implication derived from Frankfurter's concurrence
that a Board finding of illegal motive inferred from inherently discriminatory conduct should be overturned where the employer pro7
vides sufficiently compelling evidence of legal motivation.6
It was on this basis that the Third Circuit refused to enforce the
Board's finding of an 8(a)(3) violation.6 8 The court reviewed the
holding in both Radio Officers and Local 357 and found that these
cases did not make the issue of motive irrelevant.6 9 It interpreted
Radio Officers as holding that "evidentiary facts, absent proof of a
valid business reason, were sufficient to support an inference that
the disparate treatment of the employees was intended to encourage
union membership. ' 7° The court also cited to the rationale of Mackay Radio"' as supporting its conclusion. 2 The court interpreted the
63. Id. at 630.
64. Id.

65. See supra notes 48-52 (reprinting Frankfurter's concurrence).
66.

Erie Resistor, 132 N.L.R.B. at 630. (emphasis added). Thus, the Board found it

unnecessary to decide whether or not the employer actually was motivated by business considerations. See id. at 630 n.30.
67.

See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing Frankfurter's concur-

rence).

68. See International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 613 v. NLRB (Erie Resistor), 303
F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1962).
69. Id. at 362-63.
70. Id. at 363.
71. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Mackay Radio is a

classic example of obiter dicta becoming the law of the case. The facts are relatively simple.
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facts of Mackay - permanent replacement of strikers - as presenting

inherently discriminatory conduct which may tend to discourage
union membership.

The court read Mackay as sanctioning such

conduct, however, because the employer's motive was to protect and
continue his business.74 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded, the employer's motive is always relevant even in an inherently discriminatory case."
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that
it had erred in holding that "a legitimate business purpose is always

a defense to an unfair labor practice charge. 7' 6 The Court cited to

Radio Officers and Local 357 for its holding that evidence directed
specifically at intent is not always necessary, but that intent may
The union engaged in an economic strike against the employer, who hired some replacement
workers. When the strike ended, five replacement workers remained employed. In deciding
which strikers to reinstate to the vacant positions, the employer chose not to reinstate the
individuals who had been strike leaders. The Board assumed, arguendo, that the employer
could retain replacement workers and the only issue it had to decide was whether the employer
violated §8(a)(3) by the method it used to determine which strikers were eligible for reinstatement. It found that the employer used union leadership as its criteria, thereby violating
§8(a)(3) and ordered the employer to reinstate the strike leaders. Mackay Radio, 1 N.L.R.B.
201, 216-17 (1936). The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order, with one judge
disagreeing with the Board's conclusion that the refusal to reinstate was based on union leadership criteria, and the other judge finding that the individuals in question were not employees
at the time reinstatement was at issue because by participating in the strike they had quit.
Mackay Radio, 87 F.2d 611, 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1937). Thus, the issues to be decided by the
Supreme Court were whether the strikers were employees and whether the employer discriminated in reinstatement based on union activities. See 304 U.S. at 342-43. It answered both of
these questions affirmatively. Id. at 345-47. At the same time, it stated its opinion on the issue
which the Board expressly found was not necessary to decide, i.e., the legality of permanently
replacing economic strikers-the Court's opinion being that it was not illegal. Id. at 344-46. It is
this latter aspect of the case that has come to be known as the Mackay doctrine.
72. InternationalUnion of Elec. Workers, 303 F.2d at 363-64.
73. The court did not explicate how it found permanent replacement to be inherently
discriminatory. The Board's position on the issue is that it is not. The employer has an available job and is willing to employ any individual who will do the work; the striker will not do the
work, and therefore, the employer hires someone else. When the strike is over, the employer
refuses reinstatement to the striker not because he is a striker but because there are no available jobs. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 36-37, Erie Resistor Corp. v. NLRB,
373 U.S. 221 (1963) (No. 288).
74. InternationalUnion of Elec. Workers, 303 F.2d at 363-64. Not only was the Court's
"sanctioning" contained in obiter dicta, but the case itself predates Radio Officers use of common law foreseeability and the inherently discriminatory doctrine by sixteen years. Indeed, the
Supreme Court implied, in its decision in Erie Resistor wherein it rejected the Court of Appeals' reliance on Mackay in reaching its decision, that were Mackay to be decided at this
point in time the result might be different. "We have no intention of questioning the continuing vitality of the Mackay rule, but we are not prepared to extend it to the situation we have
here." Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 232.
75. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers 303 F.2d at 363-64.
76. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 227.
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sometimes be inferred from the foreseeable consequences of the employer's conduct. The Court noted that illegal intent may be inferred
from the "inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. '77 In such circumstances, the employer may claim that
its dominant motive is not to discourage union membership but to
accomplish legitimate business interests. However, the Court noted
that:
[n]evertheless, his conduct does speak for itself - it is discriminatory and it does discourage union membership and whatever the
claimed overriding justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which
he must have intended. As is not uncommon in human experience,
such situations present a complex of motives and preferring one
motive to another is in reality the far more delicate task. . .of
weighing the interests of the employees in concerted activity
against the interest of the employer in operating his business. . .and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the
intended consequences upon employee rights against the business
ends to be served by the employer's conduct.7 8
Thus, the Erie Resistor case added two new elements to the
development of the inherently discriminatory doctrine. First, the
foreseeable consequences of some types of inherently discriminatory
conduct are so destructive of the right to engage in union activities,
that even if the employer produces evidence that it was motivated by
legitimate business considerations, the Board may still find that the
employer also intended to discourage union activities. Second, in determining which of these two motives is dominant, the Board is required to engage in a balancing act - does the employer's business
interest outweigh the harm done to employee rights.
Applying this theory to the facts of Erie Resistor, the Court
found that the superseniority plan was both inherently discriminatory and inherently destructive. 79 The benefit of superseniority was
doled out based solely on the criteria of who was willing to refrain
from engaging in the strike (either by crossing the picket line or
abandoning the strike) and who was committed to participation in
the strike for the duration.80 The effects of the grant of this benefit
on the employees' right to engage in union activities were both longlasting and pernicious. Even after the strike ends, there would be a
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

228 (emphasis added).
228-29 (footnotes omitted).
231.
230-31.
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permanent distinction made in the treatment of strikers and nonstrikers: whenever a layoff is necessitated, the order of layoff for the
employees would be determined by the application of superseniority.
This permanent distinction rendered future bargaining by the union
extremely difficult, both in terms of its ability to muster support for
future strikes 81 and its ability to fairly represent the interests of its
constituency in negotiations. 2
The Court found that extending this benefit also "deals a crippling blow to the strike effort." 83 By abandoning the strike, or crossing the picket line, an employee could gain in one day a benefit
which he otherwise would have to work 20 years to attain. Moreover,
since the advantages to be gained by seniority are relative to the
seniority possessed by others, those employees who remained on
strike suffered a loss when strike-breakers received this benefit.
"This combination of threat and promise could be expected to undermutual interest and place the entire strike effort in
mine the strikers'
84
jeopardy."
The Court next turned its attention to the balancing of interests. 5 Having found the superseniority plan to be both inherently
discriminatory and destructive, the Court had to consider whether
the employer's proffered business justification was sufficient to outweigh the destructive impact of the conduct. Initially, the Court
noted that the Mackay doctrine88 allowing for the permanent replacement of economic strikers does not logically support a conclu81. Id. at 230-31. The bargaining leverage to be derived from a viable strike threat is
lost. The threat/promise effect of superseniority acts as a powerful deterrent to employee support of a strike.
82. Id. at 231. In formulating substantive proposals, the union will be caught on the
horns of a dilemma. One group of workers will press the union to negotiate away superseniority while the other group will want the benefit maintained and even extended. The basis for
this conflict of interest will not be the normal disagreement over the relative advantage of
certain benefits, e.g. whether more money should go for wages or pension improvements.
Rather, the disagreement will be based on who participated in union activities and who did
not. Attempting to reconcile the latter type of conflict almost inevitably places the union in a
breach of duty of fair representation.
Unions are allowed a wide range of reasonableness in choosing among the competing interests of the employees they represent. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338
(1953). so long as those choices are not based on arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith considerations. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). If a union
choice in a conflict situation is based on union activity considerations, such choice would be
discriminatory and a breach of the duty of fair representation. See Thompson v. Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 199 (4th Cir. 1963).
83. 373 U.S. at 230.
84. Id. at 230-31.
85. Id. at 231-32.
86. See supra notes 71-74 (discussing the Mackay doctrine).
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sion that the grant of superseniority to such replacements is also allowed. The Court found that superseniority represented a far greater
8
encroachment on employee rights. 7
Numerous sections of the NLRA evidence a "solicitude for the
right to strike" and the policy of the Act recognizes the strike as a
means for "implement[ing] and support[ing] the principles of the
collective bargaining system."88 Thus, the Court held that "in view
of the deference paid the strike weapon" under the Act and the inherently discriminatory and destructive nature of the superseniority
policy, the Board had properly concluded that the employer's business justification did not outweigh the harm inflicted on employee
rights. 9
The Board was soon confronted with an occasion for applying
the new elements added by Erie Resistor which had expanded the
inherently discriminatory doctrine - inherently destructive conduct
and the balancing of interestsY0 In Brown Food Store,91 the employer was a member of a multi-employer bargaining association.
When the union and the association were unable to reach agreement
on a new contract, the union struck and picketed one of the association members, Food Jet. The other employer-members responded by
locking out their bargaining unit employees. All the association
members, however, continued to operate their stores - Food Jet by
hiring replacement employees for the striking workers and the other
employer-members by utilizing their non-unit employees and by hiring temporary replacement workers for the locked out unit employees. The union alleged that the use of replacement workers for the
locked out employees violated §8(a)(3).92
The Board noted initially that the lockout alone, employed by
the association members in response to the union's strike against
Food Jet, was privileged, pursuant to the Buffalo Linen Supply Co.,
case, as a defensive measure by the employer to preserve the integrity of the multi-employer group. 93 But the further step of maintain87. 373 U.S. at 232.
88. Id. at 233-34 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 235-37.
90. Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. at 73, 73-74 (1962).
91. 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962), enforcement denied, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), affd,
380 U.S. 278 (1965).
92. Brown Food, 137 N.L.R.B. at 73-74.
93. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), rev'd sub nom, Truck Drivers
Local Union No. 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). This
case is not directly part of the inherently discriminatory line of cases. It followed Radio Officers but preceded the remainder of the inherently discriminatory cases and neither the Board,
nor the courts, relied on or cited to Radio Officers in reaching their decisions.
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ing operations by hiring replacements for the locked out workers ex-

ceeded the measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the
group.94
The Board determined that the employers' conduct in hiring
temporary replacements was inherently discriminatory. 5 The employers had work available and their own employees were willing to

perform the work but the employer gave the work to the replacements solely on the basis that their own employees were members of

a union which had engaged in a strike against Food Jet.96 The additional impact of temporary replacement with the lockout was inherently destructive of the employees' right to join the union.9 The
Board held that even if the employers' intent in hiring replacements
was economic self-interest, rather than to discourage union membership, it was not sufficient to negate the foreseeable effect of such
In Buffalo Linen, the Board engaged in a balancing of interests between the right of the
union to engage in a strike versus the right of the employer to protect the integrity of a multiemployer bargaining unit. See 353 U.S. at 97. The Board found that a union strike against a
single member of a multi-employer bargaining group carries with it the implicit threat of
future strikes against other members, with the aim of atomizing employer solidarity within the
group. "The calculated purpose of maintaining a strike against one employer and threatening
to strike others in the employer group at future times is to cause successive and individual
employer capitulations." 109 N.L.R.B. at 448. Thus, the employer's defensive response in locking out its employees was privileged. Id.
It should be noted that the right being weighed on the employer's side which was found
sufficient to justify the harm imposed on the right to strike was not merely the employer's
economic interest in running its business. Rather, the employer was protecting its interest in
maintaining the viability of the multi-employer bargaining group, which interest the Court
found was consistent with the federal labor policy of "promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining." 353 U.S. at 95.
94. A multi-employer bargaining group is composed of employers, engaged in the same
industry in a defined geographic area, whose employees are all represented by the same union.
Thus, if only one employer-member is closed down due to a strike and the others remain open,
the employer loses its customers to its rivals, perhaps permanently. To avoid this loss, the
struck employer is pressured to capitulate to the union's demands so that it can reopen. Having
successfully achieved its objective with the first employer, the union now strikes the next employer-member until it capitulates to the competitive pressures. By knocking off the employers
one-by-one, the union can break up the group. In order to avoid this result, Buffalo Linen
allows all the employer-members to lock out the union employees if one employer-member is
closed down during a strike. This prevents the nonstruck employers from gaining a competitive
advantage over the struck employer. But, if the struck employer continues to operate during
the strike, then there is no reason for the other members to shut down. The struck employer is
not at a competitive disadvantage - it continues to serve its customers. Brown Food, 137
N.L.R.B. at 76.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 75-76; Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 11-12, 17, NLRB
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) (No. 7).
97. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 10 n.2, NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278 (1965) (No. 7).
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replacement to discourage union membership.98 In determining
which of these two motives was dominant - the intent to discourage
union membership inferred from the conduct or the employers' economic self-interest - the Board determined that the employers' interest did not outweigh the harm to employee rights.9 9
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Board's characterization
of the employers' conduct as inherently destructive. 100 The Court
noted that, in the absence of proof relating to unlawful motive, employers have been allowed to employ economic weapons whose effects
discourage union membership, such as defensive lockouts and permanent replacement of economic strikers. The Court failed to see how
the use of temporary replacements was any more destructive of employee rights than the lockout itself, which was concededly lawful
under Buffalo Linen.'0 ' The Court was not willing to find that the
effect on employee rights from the use of the replacements exceeded
the effect from the lockout alone, merely because the employers' regular employees were willing to work. The Court appeared to premise
this conclusion on the fact that the employees' willingness to work
was motivated more by their desire to see the union's whipsaw strike
succeed than by a desire to work under the employers' terms.0 2
There was no discussion as to why the employees' motive should be
relevant to the issue of whether the employers' conduct has inherently destructive effects. °a
The Court in Brown Food did not eschew Radio Officers and its
progeny. It used Erie Resistor as an example where an employer's
action "was discriminatory conduct that carried its own indicia of
improper intent" and that the effect of that conduct was so "inherently destructive of employee interests [it] could not be saved from
illegality by an asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good
98.

Brown Food, 137 N.L.R.B. at 75.

99. Id.
100.

Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 282-83.

101.

Id. at 283-84.

102.

Id. at 284-85.

103.

Justice White, in his dissent, failed to see the connection between employee motives

and the effects of employer conduct.

[A]n employer may not displace union members with nonunion members solely on
account of union membership. . .and may not maintain operations and refuse to
retain or hire nonstriking union members, notwithstanding that most of the union
members and most of the workers at that very plant are on strike. . . . The employees are not on strike, and desire to work, for whatever reasons, and nothing in the
right to lock out can alter these facts.
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
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faith."1 4 The Court noted, however, that the analysis differs when
inherently discriminatory conduct is not inherently destructive.
When "the tendency to discourage union membership is comparatively slight, and the employers' conduct is reasonably adapted to
achieve legitimate business ends or to deal with business exigencies,
we enter into an area where improper motivation of the employers
must be established by independent evidence." 1 5
The Court disagreed with the Board's determination that the
employers' action was inherently destructive; rather it found the effect on employee rights was only comparatively slight.1 06 The Court
determined that the additional discouragement of union membership
attributable to the use of temporary replacements was comparatively
insubstantial on three grounds. First, since the replacements were
only temporary, the employees could not reasonably view the employers' conduct as threatening their jobs. 0 7 This conclusion failed
to take into account that the use of replacements did threaten the
workers' livelihood in the short-term. They were unable to earn
wages because the replacements were doing their work - a loss of
earnings which the employees would never regain.
Second, the Court noted that the employees could end the lockout by agreeing to the employers' contract terms.10 8 The Court did
not explain why it should be relevant to the issue of the impact of
the employers' conduct on employee rights that the employees have
the ability to make the employer cease its conduct.10 9 That employees can get an employer to stop discouraging them from union membership does not mean that an employer was not so discouraging
them.
104.

Id. at 287.

105. Id. at 287-88.
106. Id. at 288. Justice White, in dissent, agreed with the Board's appraisal in this regard, finding it "far more consistent with Erie Resistor and industrial realities." Id. at 298.
107. Id. at 288.
108. Id. at 289.
109. An employer's threat to lower the wage rate if the employees vote in a union is
within the employees' control. If they vote against the union the employer will not lower their
wages. This does not mitigate the coercive impact of the employer's conduct. An employer is
allowed to attempt to influence employee opinion regarding the merits of union representation,
but cannot use interference, restraint or coercion as methods of influence. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) § (c) (1982). That the threat is within the employees' ability to defuse does not
make it any less coercive. Likewise, an employer is allowed to attempt to persuade the employees to accept its proposed contract terms; this is the essence of collective bargaining. Some
methods of persuasion however, such as those which discourage union membership, are beyond
the allowable limits of the law. See Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 769 (1979), enforcement denied
and remanded on other grounds, 663 F.2d 1078. (9th Cir. 1981), modified, 278 N.L.R.B. 783
(1986), enforced, 833 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Thirdly, the Court found that since the new contract contained
a union security provision, the employees would have little to gain in
quitting the union.110 The Radio Officers case suggests that this consideration is irrelevant in determining the effect of an employer's
conduct on employee rights.11 In Radio Officers the employer argued that paying retroactive wage increases only to union members
could not have encouraged employees to join the union because the
union's own membership policy prevented the employees from joining. 112 The Co
Court in Radio Officers held that evidence that employees were in fact encouraged to join the union was not required;
rather it was sufficient if the employer's conduct could be said to
reasonably tend to encourage membership.113 Thus, the existence of
the union security clause in Brown Food which may act to keep employees from quitting the union does not mean that the employers'
conduct could not be said to reasonably tend to discourage
membership.
Having found the effect of the employer's conduct in Brown
Food comparatively slight, the Court also found the employers' conduct was "adapted to the achievement of a legitimate end - preserving the integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit."11 4 The
Court, however, did not address the Board's argument that hiring
replacements was not necessary to preserve the unit - it went beyond
the measures necessary to achieve that goal. 15 Indeed, the Court
itself, only a page earlier, had talked about employer conduct "reasonably adapted to achieve legitimate business ends. .

..

"116

A companion case, decided the same day as Brown Food, also
involved a lockout situation. In American Ship Building Co., 11 7 after
extended negotiations which left major issues unresolved, the parties
reached an impasse. Thereafter, the employer locked out the employees in order to bring economic pressure on them to accept its contract terms. 18 The Board had held that, absent special circum110.
111.
112.
113.

Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 289.
Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 52.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 50-51.

114. Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 289.

115. See supra note 94. (discussing multi-employer units and the Board's holding in
Brown Food); see also Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 296 (White, J., dissenting). See infra notes

256-68 and accompanying text, discussing the necessity for narrowly tailoring conduct to
achieve the proffered justification).
116. Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
117. American Ship Building Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963), enforced per curlam, 331
F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
118. Id. at 303-305.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/2

20

Fick: Inherently Discriminatory Conduct Revisited: Do We Know It When W
Inherently Discriminatory Conduct

1991]

stances,11 an employer cannot lock out its employees in aid of its
bargaining position. 120
This holding, based on a long line of Board lockout cases, 2 ' was
premised on the finding that an employer lockout constitutes inherently discriminatory conduct which carries its own indicia of intent.
The discrimination was between how the employer would have
treated its employees if they were not represented by a union bargaining agent, i.e., no lockout, and how it treated its employees
because they were so represented. "Respondent laid off its employees
because they were engaged in lawful collective bargaining through
their statutory representatives; it follows also that the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the Respondent's conduct were such as
would normally infringe employee rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act. .. 122

Having found the lockout to be inherently discriminatory, the
Board considered whether the employer's justification was sufficient
to overcome the inference of illegal motive. It held that an employer's fear of loss of customers or future business in the event of a
strike did not justify the interference with employee rights caused by
the lockout.'23 The balance struck was based on the fact that the Act
specifically guarantees the right to strike as a weapon available to
the employees as a means of securing better working conditions. A
corollary effect of this right, and a measure of its effectiveness, is the
economic disruption caused to the employer's business. The Board
concluded that the right to strike would be a hollow one if the emconduct and immunize
ployer were allowed to engage in anticipatory
24
itself from the effects of the strike.'
119. See Building Contractors Ass'n of Rockford, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1962) (permitting lockout where public safety and welfare endangered); Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 268 (1951) (lockout allowed to protect the property of customers if strike is imminent); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (permitting lockout to prevent waste
or spoilage of perishable inventories); see also American Ship, 380 U.S. at 307 (listing cases

where Board permitted lockouts).
120. American Ship, 142 N.L.R.B. at 1364.
121. See Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958), enf'd 270 F.2d 40
(3rd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959); American Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B.
820 (1956), vacated, 224 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B.
1448 (1952), enfd 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953).
122. American Brake, 116 N.L.R.B. at 826 (involving an employer lockout for the pur-

pose of bringing pressure on the union to agree to the employer's proposals); see also Brief for
the National Labor Relations Board at 11-12, 14-15 & n.11, American Ship, 380 U.S. 300
(1965) (No. 255); see infra text accompanying notes 172-80 (discussing sequential
discrimination).
123. American Brake, 116 N.L.R.B. at 832.
124.

Id.
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The Supreme Court disagreed with both the Board's conclusion
that the conduct was inherently discriminatory as well as the results
of its balancing of interests. The Court found it "difficult to understand" how the employer was discriminating against union members. 25 It noted that the employer had not locked out only union
members nor had it conditioned recall upon resignation from the
union. The Court did admit that the employees were suffering a disadvantage because of the union's bargaining demands (the basis for
the Board's finding of discrimination). 2 '
The Court followed this observation with a non sequitur; it
shifted the discussion from whether the employer's conduct was inherently discriminatory to a consideration of other types of employer
conduct which create economic disadvantage and yet are not unlawful, citing as examples Mackay, Tex-Tan, and an employer's refusal
to make a concession in bargaining. 1 Justice White, in his concurrence, also had trouble with the Court's analysis on this point. "I
would have thought it apparent that loss of jobs for an indefinite
period. . .because of the union's negotiating activity, itself protected
under §7, hardly encourage[s] affiliation with a union. '"128

Having found no inherently discriminatory conduct, the Court
noted that there was no independent evidence that the employer was
actually motivated by a desire to discourage union membership, but
125. American Ship, 380 U.S. at 312-13. But see infra notes 183-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the concept of sequential discrimination).
126. American Ship, 380 U.S. at 312; see supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
127. American Ship, 380 U.S. at 312-13. Moreover, the cited examples are clearly distinguishable from the employer conduct in the present case. As previously discussed, the permanent replacement of strikers allowed by Mackay is arguably not inherently discriminatory
and therefore the fact that the disadvantage it creates is not illegal does not determine whether
a lockout is inherently discriminatory. See supra note 73. Even if one considers Mackay to
involve inherently discriminatory conduct, the disadvantage it produced is not illegal because
the employer's interest outweighs the disadvantage produced. This latter conclusion is the result of a balancing of interest, and is not helpful in determining the initial issue of whether
certain conduct is inherently discriminatory.
In NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963), the court sanctioned the unilateral imposition of contract terms premised on two specific statutory grounds: §8(d) explicitly
states that the duty to bargain does not require agreeing to the other side's terms, and imposition is allowed only after the employer has exhausted its statutory duty to bargain and impasse
is reached. Id. at 482-83. It is also questionable whether unilateral imposition constitutes inherently discriminatory conduct - in the absence of a union the employer would have imposed
its own terms on the employees. The issue was not raised in Tex-Tan, however, as it was
decided under §8(a)(5). Lastly, an employer's refusal to make a concession is explicitly sanctioned by the Act in §8(d) and cannot be considered inherently discriminatory.
128. American Ship, 380 U.S. at 324 (White, J., concurring). White concurred only
with the result of the case, not with its reasoning. Id. at 318. He found no unfair labor practice
because, on the facts, he determined that the lockout was caused by lack of work not by the
employer's desire to pressure the employees to accept its bargaining proposals. Id. at 322.
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rather the evidence showed its intention was merely to obtain
favorable contract terms. 12 9 Therefore, there was no violation of
§8(a)(3).130
The Court also found that the Board, by engaging in a balancing of interest, had exceeded its authority.' 3 ' Since there was no inherently discriminatory conduct nor any independent evidence of illegal motive, there was no occasion for an assessment of the
employer's motive as measured against the harm to employee rights.
By balancing interests in this case, the Board in essence was acting
as an "arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use"
in bargaining and deciding the lockout was unfair because it gave
the employer too much power.' 32 The Board, however, does not posof policy decision which is a
sess the authority to make this type
33
function.1
judicial,
legislative, not
These lockout cases do not represent a change in the inherently
discriminatory doctrine, but rather a disagreement over the application of the doctrine to specific facts. The next Supreme Court case to
deal with this issue specifically reaffirmed the doctrine as developed
from Radio Officers through Erie Resistor.
34
involved an employer's refusal to pay acGreat Dane Trailers1
crued vacation benefits to strikers while paying such benefits to nonstrikers, replacements and cross-overs. 135 The Court, in finding the
employer's conduct violative of §8(a)(3),1 31 summarized the inherently discriminatory doctrine:
From this review of our recent decisions, several principles of
controlling importance here can be distilled. First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was
"inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of
an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair
labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the
conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the
129. Id. at 313.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 316.
132. Id. at 317 (citing NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960)).
133. American Ship, 380 U.S. at 318.
134. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).

135.

Id. at 27-30.

136.

On its face, the Court found that the employer's conduct was inherently discrimi-

natory. Id. at 32. The determination as to who would receive accrued vacation benefits was
based on whether or not an employee had engaged in protected strike activity. Likewise, there
was no doubt that paying benefits based on protected strike activity has the foreseeable effect

of discouraging employees from engaging in such activity. Since the employer produced no
evidence of legitimate motive, it was found to have violated §8(a)(3). Id. at 32-34.
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adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is
"comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to
sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence
of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.
Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer
engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate
objectives
137
since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.
38 the employer refused to reinstate strikIn Fleetwood Trailer,1
ing employees at the termination of the strike because no job vacancies existed at that time, since the employer hired permanent
replacements during the strike. Subsequently, when job openings occurred, the employer hired new employees rather than reinstating
the strikers. The Board held that the employer discriminated against
the strikers by hiring new workers rather than reinstating the strikers, thereby violating §8(a)(3). 139 The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order, holding that on the date the strikers applied
for reinstatement, there were no jobs available, and there was no
proof that the employer's subsequent decision to hire new employees
was motivated by antiunion considerations. 40
The Supreme Court found that the effect of refusing to reinstate
strikers was to discourage employees from exercising their right to
strike, and that unless the employer can show legitimate and substantial business justification for such refusal, it is guilty of violating
§8(a)(3).1 41 The Court analogized the instant case to Great Dane,
stating that the refusal to reinstate strikers is no less destructive of
employee rights than the refusal to pay accrued vacation benefits,
and since the employer has failed to show any justification for its
conduct, it violated §8(a)(3).142 As in Great Dane, the Court did not
have to decide whether the impact of the employer's conduct was
inherently destructive or only comparatively slight, since in neither
case had the employer shown a business justification.
The Board, in a subsequent case dealing with the scope of a
striker's reinstatement rights, applied the principles of Fleetwood
Trailer and specifically found that a refusal to reinstate strikers to
137. Id. at 34.
138. 153 N.L.R.B. 425 (1965), enforcement denied, 366 F,2d 126 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated, 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
139. Id. at 426-28.
140. See Fleetwood Trailer, 366 F.2d at 129-130.
141. See Fleetwood Trailer, 389 U.S. at 378.
142. See id. at 380.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/2

24

Fick: Inherently Discriminatory Conduct Revisited: Do We Know It When W
1991]

Inherently Discriminatory Conduct

available positions is inherently destructive of employee rights. 143
Even though inherently destructive, however, such conduct can be
justified through a balancing of interests in certain instances, such as
where the employer shows that the nature of its business has
jobs require skills different from those possessed by
changed and4 the
4
the strikers.
The inherently discriminatory doctrine has most recently been
applied by the Court in the Metropolitan Edison case, 145 wherein
the Court affirmed the Board's findings that the employer's conduct
was both inherently discriminatory and inherently destructive and
that the employer's proffered justification was insufficient to outweigh the harm done to employee rights. 46 The union, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 563, and the employer were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which contained a no-strike clause. During the life of the agreement, an outsider union set up a picket line protesting the refusal of a contractor
(not the employer) at the worksite to hire union workers. IBEW
members, including the president and vice-president, refused to cross
the picket line, which refusal was a violation of the no-strike clause.
The employer disciplined all the IBEW members who refused to
cross the line by imposing 5 and 10 day suspensions. It imposed a 25
day suspension, however, on the two union officers, based on both
their refusal to cross the line as well as their failure to engage in
affirmative efforts as union officers to enforce the no-strike pledge.
The union alleged that by imposing harsher discipline on union officers the employer violated §8(a)(3). 47
The Board, adopting the analysis of the administrative law
143. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). The Laidlaw doctrine has been accepted and applied
by the various circuit courts of appeal. See, e.g. Radio Sprinkler Fitters Union v. NLRB, 681
F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Soule Glass and Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir.
1981); NLRB v. Vitronic Division of Penn Corp., 630 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979); General
Teamsters Local 162 v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide,
Inc., 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977); Clinch Valley Clinic Hosp. v. NLRB, 516 F.2d 996 (4th
Cir. 1975); H.F. Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Hartmann
Luggage Co., 453 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, Inc., 442 F.2d
1056 (10th Cir. 1971); American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1970).
144. See, e.g., Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. at 1369 n.15; accord Fleetwood Trailers,
389 U.S. at 379. In such circumstances, the balancing of interests between the employee right
to engage in union activity and the employer's right to maintain its business operations weighs
in favor of the employer. Id.
145. 252 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1980), enforced, 663 F.2d 478 (3rd Cir. 1981), aff/d, 460 U.S.
693 (1983).
146. See MetropolitanEdison, 460 U.S. 693.
147. MetropolitanEdison, 252 N.L.R.B. at 1032-33.
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judge, held that selecting employees for discipline based on their position as union officers was inherently discriminatory.1 48 The determination of who would receive a more severe penalty was, on its
face, based on who held union office. The foreseeable effect of such
discrimination was inherently destructive of employee
rights - it dis149
couraged employees from holding union office.
The employer's interest in ensuring the integrity of the no-strike
pledge was deemed insufficient to outweigh the harm done to employee rights. 15 0 The employer arrogated to itself the responsibility
for deciding what role union officers should play in a wildcat strike
situation. This intrusion on the union's right to manage its own internal affairs resulted in the employer adversely affecting an employee's job based on what the employer perceived to be a misuse of
union office. Allowing an employer to penalize an employee based on
his performance as a union officer would undermine the collective
bargaining process by placing the union in a subordinate position to
management.'
The Court agreed with both the Board's legal analysis and its
application of the law to the facts. 5 2 The somewhat conclusory finding by the Board that the conduct was inherently destructive "because it discriminates solely on the basis of union status"' 5 3 and deters "qualified employees from holding [union] office" was embraced
by the Court without any additional analysis. 54 The Court also concurred with the Board's balancing of interests, finding the Board's
view consistent with the policies of the Act. 55 Allowing an employer
to determine the scope of a union officer's obligations under penalty
of employment-related discipline would be contrary to the process of
collective bargaining envisioned by the Act.
The above cases clearly defined the general contours of the inherently discriminatory doctrine, although the specifics of its application remain somewhat unclear. While motive is a necessary ele148. Id. at 1035-36.
149. See id. at 1030 n. 1, 1034. See also Brief for the National Labor Relations Board
at 20-23, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983)(No. 81-1664).
150. Metropolitan Edison, 252 N.L.R.B. at 1035-36.
151. See id. Of course, if the union were to specifically agree with the employer and, in
the contract, provide that the union officers had an affirmative duty to enforce the no-strike
pledge, the employer's imposition of a harsher penalty would be justified. Metropolitan

Edison, 460 U.S. at 706-707.
152. See, 460 U.S. at 702-10.
153. 460 U.S. at 702 (citation omitted). This fact actually goes to the inherently discriminatory nature of the conduct and not its inherently destructive effect.
154. Id. at 702-703.
155. Id. at 704.
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ment in proving a violation of §8(a) (3), in some cases motive can be
inferred from the employer's conduct itself. An employer can be held
to have intended the foreseeable consequences of its conduct. This

method of inferring motive can be used when the employer's conduct

is inherently discriminatory. Where the employer's conduct, on its

face, classifies employees based on union activity, it is inherently discriminatory. Parceling out employment benefits based on union ac-

tivity has the foreseeable effect of either encouraging or discouraging
union membership (depending on whether benefits are given or withheld respectively). The employer, therefore, can be held to have intended this foreseeable effect and can be found guilty of violating
§8(a)(3).
If, however, the employer is able to prove 56 that its inherently
discriminatory conduct was motivated by legitimate and substantial

business justification, it can undercut the inference of intent drawn
from its conduct where the degree of harm inflicted on employee
rights is comparatively slight. Under these circumstances, specific
evidence related to antiunion motive must be found in order to prove
a violation of §8(a)(3).
Where the degree of harm inflicted on employee rights by the
employer's inherently discriminatory conduct is inherently destructive, then even if the employer proves it acted for legitimate and
substantial business reasons it can still be found to have violated
156. It is unclear whether the employer's burden at this stage is one of production or
proof. The Court tends to use the terms interchangeably in its decisions. In Great Dane, the
Court speaks of the "employer introduc[ing] evidence" and "com[ing] forward with evidence,"
suggesting a burden of production. 388 U.S. at 34. Then the Court notes, however, that in this
case "[t]he company simply did not meet the burden of proof." Id. In Fleetwood Trailer, the
Court states that "[t]he burden of proving justification is on the employer." 389 U.S. at 378.
In a footnote the court reiterates that the burden of proof is on the employer. 389 U.S. at 379
n.4 (citing Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34).
Board cases, however, suggest that the Board views the employer's burden as one of proof,
not merely production of evidence. Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 634, 636
(1973); Laidlaw, 171 N.L.R.B. at 1370; accord Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088
(1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982)(Great Dane
supporting the shifting of the burden of proof concerning motive to the employer).
The court in Local 1384, UAW v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1985), distinguishes
between the employer's burden in a comparatively slight case versus an inherently destructive
case. In the former, the employer only has a burden of coming forward with evidence of a
legitimate and substantial business justification whereas in the latter, the employer carries the
burden of proof of a justification. 756 F.2d at 488. This distinction makes sense in light of
Frankfurter's characterization of proof of inherently discriminatory conduct as raising only an
inference of motive. See Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 56. Whereas when conduct is both inherently discriminatory and destructive, the Board can find unlawful motive even in the face of a
justification. This implies that inherently destructive conduct establishes illegal motive as a
matter of law and the employer carries an affirmative duty to prove its justification.
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§8(a)(3). The Board must balance the conflicting interests to determine whether the employer's business purpose is sufficient to outweigh the destructive impact on employee rights. When the balance
weighs in favor of employee rights, the employer is guilty of violating
§8(a)(3).
Thus, the key concepts in applying the inherently discriminatory
doctrine are: 1) identifying inherently discriminatory conduct; 2)
identifying inherently destructive conduct; 3) determining what constitutes a legitimate and substantial business justification; and 4)balancing conflicting interests.
II.

A.

DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS

Inherently Discriminatory Conduct

"The language of §8(a)(3) is not ambiguous. . .[T]his section
does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited. 157 As the Supreme Court noted in Local 357,
Teamsters, the existence of a hiring hall may indeed encourage
union membership, but since the facilities of the hall were available
on a nondiscriminatory basis to union members and nonmembers
alike, there was no violation of §8(a)(3). 158
Inherently discriminatory conduct is that conduct which, on its
face, makes distinctions between employees based on union activity;
the criterion of union membership is the basis for the employer's action. 159 The most easily identified type of inherently discriminatory
conduct is that which involves simultaneous discrimination.
The Erie Resistor and Great Dane cases present examples of
inherently discriminatory conduct involving simultaneous discrimination.160 The employer classified its current workforce based on
whether or not the employee had participated in strike activity and
then granted a benefit (superseniority or vacation pay, respectively)
to those individuals who had not participated.181 In Huck Mfg.,162
157. Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 42-43.
158. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690, 694 § n.6 (2d
Cir. 1965); Quality Castings Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 36, 40 (6th Cir. 1963); Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 83 (9th Cir. 1960).
160. See supra notes 51-58 & 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing Erie Resistor
and Great Dane respectively).
161. See also Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 693 (dividing current workforce into
two groups - union members who engaged in strike and union officers who engaged in strike and imposing punishment based on union officer status); George Banta Co. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d
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the employees engaged in a strike beginning Tuesday of the workweek. The employer paid the nonstrikers doubletime for the entire

week, including the Monday before the strike began. Even though all
employees had worked that Monday, the strikers were only paid

straight time. As noted by the court, receipt of doubletime for Mon-

day work was based on which employees had engaged in union activ63
ity and therefore was inherently discriminatory.'

Similarly, in Bechtel Corp.,.6 4 the court found the employer's

conduct was inherently discriminatory. The union local was involved
in an internal political dispute and the majority party members refused to work with the dissidents. The employer, therefore, divided
the workforce into groups - majority and dissident factions - and
hired only those on the majority list; a clear example of apportioning

employment benefits based on union activities.
65

Dairylea,

Likewise, in

the collective bargaining agreement between the em-

ployer and the union contained a clause granting superseniority to
union shop stewards. The clause on its face granted a job benefit
(holding union office) and thus
(seniority) based on union activity
166
was inherently discriminatory.
In order for the employer's conduct to be inherently discriminatory, the classification of employees must be directly based on union
6
two employees filed a grievance
activity. In P.W. Supermarkets,'1
won. While the grievance was
they
which
increase,
seeking a wage
pending, the employer was also exploring the possibility of subcontracting the work. Upon receiving bids, the employer compared the
cost of subcontracting to its own labor costs and found subcontracting to be substantially cheaper. Accordingly, the employer discharged the two workers and subcontracted the work. Without discussing the issue of inherent discrimination, the administrative law

10 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983) An employer instituted a preferential
reinstatement system to govern the job placement of workers after the strike ended. Under the
system, cross-overs were assigned to the jobs they held before the strike began, regardless of
the type of job they held during the strike. Id. at 18. After the cross-overs had been reinstated,
the full-term strikers were reinstated to the remaining job vacancies. In finding a violation of
§8(a)(3), the court noted that "the relevant question is whether the employer has illegally
burdened the statutory right to strike by artificially dividing the workforce into those who did
not engage in strike activity and those who did." Id. at 19.
162. Huck Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 693 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1982).
163. Id. at 1180, 1183-84.
164. NLRB v. Bechtel Corp., 328 F.2d 28, 39-40 (10th Cir. 1964).
165. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforced sub nom, NLRB v. Milk
Drivers & Dairy Employees, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir 1976).
166. 219 N.L.R.B. at 658-59 n.10.
167. P.W. Supermarkets, 269 N.L.R.B. 839 (1984).
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judge found the employer's conduct inherently destructive and violative of §8(a)(3).16 8 The Board disagreed with the administrative law
judge's analysis because he had overlooked the premise for such a
finding - "a causal connection between an employee's protected
union activities and an action by the employer detrimental to the
employee's tenure ..

."'9 The Board found that the conduct was

not inherently discriminatory; the employer's decision to discharge
the employees was not based on the filing of the grievance but rather
on the comparative cost saving. 170
The direct connection between union activity and the employer's
conduct was also missing in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.'7 ' In
that case the employer awarded annual bonuses based on five factors, one of which was productivity. The employees at the plant at
which a strike had occurred during the year in question did not receive a bonus because productivity had suffered as a result of the
strike. The court held that although the strike may have caused the
productivity drop, the employer's decision was, on its face, based on
productivity and therefore not inherently discriminatory. 172
A second type of inherently discriminatory conduct involves sequential discrimination.
In this situation, all of the employees
equally suffer an employment detriment, or receive a benefit, as a
result of the employer's conduct; there is no difference in treatment
among the employees. The difference in treatment is measured by
how the employer treated the employees as a group before union activity was present and after union activity occurred. For example, in
Jemco, the employer denied vacation pay to all employees after a
strike occurred. 74 The employer argued its conduct was not discriminatory since it treated all employees alike."7 5 The court rejected that
argument, holding:
we do not believe that unequal treatment of different classes of employees is a prerequisite to finding a Section 8(a)(3) violation
168. Id. at 839-40.
169. Id. at 840.
170. Id. at 840-41; cf. Century Air Freight, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 730 (1987)(holding that
the employer's decision to discharge the employees and subcontract the work was based on
their bargaining demand for a wage increase and threat to strike in support thereof, and was
therefore discriminatory conduct based on the employees' protected activity and violated
§8(a)(3)).
171. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960).
172. Id. at 84-85.
173. See NLRB v. Jemco, Inc., 465 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1109 (1973).
174. Jemco, 465 F.2d at 1150.
175. Id.at 1151.
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where all employees engaged in a concerted activity. The interpretation of Section 8(a)(3) which the company urges us to adopt
would lead to the somewhat absurd result that an employer could
never be found in violation of that Section so long as he was careful
to treat all employees alike, no matter how destructive of employee
rights his conduct may be. The Section 8(a)(3) discrimination in
the present case lies in the employment benefit afforded to all employees prior to their engaging in concerted activity and the benefit
denied to all employees after they engaged in such
which was
1761
activity.
In Allied Industrial Workers,177 the employer had posted the
vacation schedule but after the strike began it announced that it was
delaying all vacations. The employer argued its conduct was not discriminatory because it refused to pay vacation pay to all employees,
strikers and nonstrikers alike. The court disagreed, finding that a
178 Similarly,
practice uniformly applied can still be discriminatory.
17 9
in United Aircraft, the employer announced wage increases of 8 %
the first year, and 3 % the second and third years. Before the second
raise was due, the employees voted for union representation and the
employer did not give the raise. The court found it "difficult to imagine discriminatory employer conduct more likely to discourage the
exercise by employees of the right to180 engage in concerted activity"
than the employer's conduct at bar.
Lastly, inherently discriminatory conduct can involve adverse
impact discrimination. In this situation, the employer's policy applies
to all employees but the beneficial or detrimental impact of the policy is felt disproportionately by employees based on whether or not
they engaged in union activity. For example, in Lone Star Industries, 8 ' the employer had a 23-year-old policy of assigning work
based on seniority. Thus, during slack seasons, the more senior workers were fully employed and maintained their wage level, whereas
junior employees saw a drop in wages due to. fewer work assign176. Id. at 1152 (footnote omitted); see also Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB,
641 F.2d 553, 557 (8th Cir. 1981)(stating that "[w]here all the employees engaged in a concerted activity, the requisite disparity is between the treatment of all employees before and
after the concerted activity.") (citation omitted).
177. Allied Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
178. Id. at 871-72.
179. NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 490 F.2d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1973).
180. Id. at 1109-10; see also Mullins Broadcasting Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 119 (1972) (stating that the employer's conduct in reducing the employees' hours of work by 10% after the
employees petitioned for a union election was inherently discriminatory).
181. Lone Star Industries Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 550, 552 (1986), enforced in pertinent
part, 125 L.R.R.M. 3063 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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ments. Approximately one month after the employees went on strike,
the employer instituted a rotation system for assigning work, which
it maintained after the strike ended. The union alleged the employer's rotation system violated §8(a)(3) whereas the employer contended there could be no violation because there was no discrimination - the policy applied uniformly to strikers and nonstrikers
alike."8 2
The short answer to this is that, although facially neutral, the policy in fact had the predictable and actual effect of creating conditions after the strike ended in which strikers would lose advantages
in job assignments they had hitherto enjoyed under the 23-year-old
work assignment policy and strike replacements would be the beneficiaries of those losses ...
Obviously, the employees with the greatest seniority would
tend to be those who had worked for the Respondent before the
strike began; and 90 percent of Respondent's pre-strike work force
went out on strike. In fact, of the strikers recalled a year after the
strike commenced, only two, at most, had less seniority than the
replacement.. . . Employees with substantial seniority, who would

regularly be eligible to receive the better work assignments under
the original long-established policy, experienced significant economic losses ... .7 188
7. The fact that the very small percentage (about 10 percent) of the prestrike
work force who did not join the strike suffered similar detriment does not change
our conxlusion. The change overall disfavored strikers and favored strike replacements once the strike ended; and the entire prestrike work force lost valuable rights.

The fact that the very small percentage (about 10 percent) of the
prestrike work force who did not join the strike suffered similar detriment does not change our conclusion. The change overall disfavored strikers and favored strike replacements once the strike ended;
and the entire prestrike work force lost valuable rights.
A similar situation arose in Moore Business Forms."" Prior to
the strike, the employer operated three shifts and employees were
assigned to shifts on a rotation basis. When the strike began, the
employer was initially able to operate only one shift with replacement workers. As more replacements were hired and strikers crossed
the line, the employer placed them on the second shift and then the
third, and it instituted a fixed system of shift assignments - which182.
183.
184.
574 F.2d

Id.
See supra footnote 7.
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 393 (1976), enforced in pertinent part,
835 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ever shift one was assigned to was permanent. Although the policy of
fixed shifts applied uniformly to all - replacements, crossovers and
strikers - the detrimental effect of the policy was felt disproportionwho were permaately by the late cross-overs and full-term strikers
85
shifts.1
desirable
less
the
to
assigned
nently
In determining whether conduct is inherently discriminatory it
is not sufficient to look solely at whether or not the conduct is
facially discriminatory. It is also necessary to find that the foreseeable effect of such facially discriminatory conduct is to encourage or
discourage union membership. "Nor does this section [8(a)(3)] outlaw discrimination in employment as such; only such discrimination
as encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization is
proscribed.'1 6 As the Court noted in Radio Officers, it is "a fact of
common experience - that the desire of employees to unionize is directly proportional to the advantage thought to be obtained from
such action."'18 7 In most cases involving some form of inherently discriminatory conduct, it is obvious that the employer is granting an
advantage to, or imposing a burden on, employees based on union
activity; but, obvious or not, this foreseeable effect must be present.
Discrimination based on union membership which does not involve an employment advantage or disadvantage does not have the
foreseeable effect of encouraging or discouraging union membership,
and therefore cannot violate §8(a)(3). Such was the case in Radio
and Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union.'88 The collective bargaining
agreement between the union and the employer allowed employees to
take longer unpaid leaves of absence without loss of seniority to engage in union business than for leaves unconnected to union business.
The clause was clearly facially discriminatory in that eligibility for
longer unpaid leaves of absence was directly based on union activity.
The Board, however, found that this discrimination did not tend to
encourage employees to become active unionists and thus did not violate the Act." 9
Instead, it merely removes, in part, a condition that would discourage employees from taking temporary union jobs. Thus, an em185. Id. at 407-08.
186. See Radio Officers, 347 U.S. at 43.
187. Id. at 46.
188.
189.

Radio and Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 288 N.L.R.B. 374 (1988).
Id. The section of the Act alleged to have been violated was §8(b)(2) - the union

equivalent to §8(a)(3). Section 8(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that it is an unfair labor

practice for a labor organization "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection [8](a)(3). . . ." 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(2)(1990).
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ployee who stays at his job with WPIX is no worse off with respect
to seniority than an employee who takes a leave of absence to work
for the Union; that employee who remains on the job is no more
disadvantaged by his fellow employee's having taken the leave for
that purpose than he would be if that individual had remained on
the job. It is unreasonable to suppose that an employee would take
an outside-the-plant union job simply to retain the seniority that he
would possess even if he did not take such job.1 90
Thus, inherently discriminatory conduct is that employer conduct which, on its face, discriminates against employees based on
union activity criteria. Such discrimination can manifest itself either
through simultaneous, sequential or adverse impact discrimination.
The discriminatory conduct must have the foreseeable effect of encouraging or discouraging union membership. This foreseeable effect
is present when the result of the discrimination is gaining an employment benefit or suffering an employment-related detriment.
B.

Inherently Destructive Conduct

The concept of inherently destructive conduct refers to the severity of the degree of harm inflicted on employee rights by inherently discriminatory conduct. The Court in Great Dane noted that
the adverse effects of inherently discriminatory conduct on employee
rights may be either inherently destructive or comparatively
slight.191
The adverse effect on employee rights can manifest itself in two
ways: by either the severity of the harm suffered by the employee for
exercising his rights or the severity of the impact on the statutory
right being exercised. Thus, the effect of a delay in paying a benefit
to employees until a strike is over, at which time the employees will
receive the benefit, is significantly different from the effect of refusing to pay the benefit altogether. While both acts may discourage
employees from engaging in a strike, in the first situation the employees may still engage in a strike knowing they will eventually receive the benefit when the strike is over, whereas in the second situation, the employees may refrain from striking since that is the only
way to ensure receipt of the benefit. Because of the difference in the
degree of harm suffered by the employees - delay of benefit vs. loss
of benefit - the impact of the conduct on employee rights is different.
In the first instance the impact is comparatively slight; in the second
190. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 288 N.L.R.B. at 384.

191.

Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34.
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192
instance it is inherently destructive.
A second way in which the adverse effects of inherently discriminatory conduct are felt is by the severity of the impact on the statutory rights being exercised. For example, an employer's decision to
lock out employees and a refusal to reinstate strikers when vacancies
exist, both impact on the right to strike. In the former case, however,
the impact is only on the employees' ability to control the timing of a
strike - a comparatively slight impact on the right to strike - whereas
in the latter case the impact is on the employees' ability to engage in
a strike at all - an inherently destructive impact on the right to
strike. 93
deAs more than one jurist has noted, the term "inherently
Court.194
Supreme
the
by
defined
precisely
been
structive" has never
Any attempt to establish guidelines for measuring the severity of
harm must begin with a consideration of the Court's opinion in Erie
Resistor,95 the only case to date in which the Court discussed the
factors which led it to conclude that the employer's conduct was inherently destructive. An important caveat to any consideration of
Erie Resistor in this regard is that the Court's discussion is neither
an exhaustive listing of factors, nor a listing of required factors for
differentiating comparatively slight from inherently destructive effects. The Court in no manner suggested that its discussion was definitive; rather it is illustrative and fact specific - an examination of
the specific characteristics of superseniority which made it inherently
destructive.'
conIn Erie Resistor the destructive impact of the employer's
197
duct was on both the employees and the statutory rights. As to the
severity of harm suffered by the employees, the Court noted that the
strikers' seniority would be inferior to all replacements and crossovers and that superseniority would have a lasting effect on the strikin payment of
192. Compare NLRB v. Borden, Inc., 600 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1979)(delay
Corp., 603
Elec.
Westinghouse
v.
NLRB
with
accrued vacation pay not inherently destructive)
destructive).
inherently
was
benefits
vacation
pay
to
1979)(refusal
Cir.
F.2d 610 (7th
of exclu193. Compare American Ship, 380 U.S. at 310 (a lockout deprives the union
right to
the
imply
not
does
strike
to
right
the
but
strike
a
of
timing
the
sive control over
reinstate
to
1368-69(refusing
at
N.L.R.B.
exclusively control timing) with Laidlaw Corp., 171
striker to vacant position inherently destructive of the right to strike).
(8th Cir. 1981);
194. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 533, 559
Johns-Manville
1979);
Cir.
(9th
495
491,
F.2d
595
NLRB,
v.
Inc.
Service,
Loomis Courier
J. dissenting), cert.
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1144 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom,
denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
195. 373 U.S. 221. See supra notes 51-89 and accompanying text.
196. 373 U.S. at 230-31.
197. Id. at 231.
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ers. Seniority governs layoffs and an employee's seniority is relative
to other employees; the fact that strikers' seniority will be inferior
means that they have lost a valuable employment benefit - priority
for a job when jobs are scarce. This loss is protracted because every
future layoff, for as long as there are any replacements or cross-overs
employed, will be determined by superseniority.
As to the severity of the impact on statutory rights, superseniority "deal[t] a crippling blow" to the right to strike and
"render[ed] future [collective] bargaining difficult, if not impossible."' 98 In fact, the grant of superseniority induced employees to
abandon the strike and the strike collapsed ten days later. Clearly,
superseniority affected not just an aspect of the right to strike but
the very ability of employees to engage in a strike. Superseniority
also created a conflict of interest for the union in future bargaining
with the employer and undermined the union's ability to credibly use
the threat of a strike as bargaining leverage in future negotiations.1 99
This weakened the right of employees to "bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing. '"200

In Metropolitan Edison, the Court looked to the adverse effect
on statutory rights and concluded that imposing more severe penalties on employees because they were union officers "inhibits qualified
employees from holding office" and is therefore inherently destructive. 2 °1 The punishment impacted on the statutory right to hold office
by deterring employees from seeking office.20 2
These cases provide some initial guidance for labeling the impact of inherently discriminatory conduct as inherently destructive.
When the harm suffered by employees is the loss of a valuable employment benefit and the harm suffered is long-lasting in effect, the
conduct is inherently destructive. 20 3 When the impact on statutory
rights is such that the right is rendered nugatory (the strike collapsed) or the ability to exercise the right is severely hampered (future bargaining rendered difficult or deterrence to the right to hold
198. Id. at 230-31.
199. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
201. 460 U.S. at 703.
202. Id. at 702-703.
203. It is not clear from Erie Resistor whether the loss of the benefit alone would have
been sufficient to classify the conduct as inherently destructive. 373 U.S. 221. The Court noted
that both the loss and its durational effect were present. Id. at 234-36. As will be discussed

later, subsequent cases have found a loss of benefit by itself sufficiently harmful to cause the
employer's conduct to be labeled inherently destructive. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
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union office) then the conduct is inherently destructive.
Cases in which the Board and the courts of appeal have considered the issue of inherently destructive conduct also provide useful
guidance. In weighing the severity of the harm suffered by employees, both the Board and the courts have found inherently discriminatory conduct which causes loss of employment to be inherently destructive.2 0 4 Obviously, loss of employment -whether by discharge,
refusal to hire or refusal to recall - is the severest harm a worker can
suffer. This view is consistent with the generally recognized principle
that discharge from employment is the capital punishment of industrial relations.20
Less drastic measures can also cause severe harm to employees.
Loss of a valuable employment benefit has been found inherently destructive. As discussed previously, Erie Resistor involved the loss of
a valuable employment benefit - seniority - which loss also had a

of benefit can be
long-term impact.206 Moreover, even a one-time loss
20 7 the employer deElectric,
inherently destructive. In Westinghouse
nied vacation benefits to strikers while granting them to cross-overs.
20 8
The court found the employer's conduct inherently destructive. In
New Orleans Public Service, 0 9 the employer provided tuition refunds and interest-free educational loans to all its employees except
held to
those employees who were also union officers; this policy was
210
be inherently destructive. Similarly, in United Aircraft, the employer's refusal to implement a scheduled wage increase because employees voted for the union was also inherently destructive conduct.
The benefit loss suffered by employees does not necessarily have
to involve a monetary aspect. The result of the employer's inherently
discriminatory conduct in Moore Business Forms"' was that strikers
204. See, e.g., NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing constructive discharged); NLRB v. Bechtel Corp., 328 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1964) (discussing refusal to hire); Swift Indep. Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 423 (1988) (discussing discharge); Gar-

land Coal & Mining Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 963 (1985) (discussing discharge); Wintz Motor
Freight, Inc.,265 N.L.R.B. 922 (1982) (discussing discharge); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B.
1366 (1968) (discussing refusal to reinstate).
205. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 661 nn. 60 & 62 (4th ed.

1985).
206.
207.
208.

373 U.S. at 230-31.
603 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 617. Great Dane also involved the denial of vacation benefits to strikers, but

the Court did not have to decide whether the effect was comparatively slight or inherently

destructive, as the employer failed to come forward with any evidence of a legitimate business

justification for its inherently discriminatory conduct. 388 U.S. at 34-35.
209.
210.
211.

197 N.L.R.B. 725 (1972).
490 F.2d 1105 (2d Cir. 1973).
Moore Business Forms, 224 N.L.R.B. 393 (1976), enforced in pertinent part, 574
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were assigned to less desirable work shifts. Although this did not
cause the strikers to lose any money, this change in working conditions requiring strikers to work at less desirable times of the day was
held to be inherently destructive.11 2
Other cases have considered the severity of the impact on the
statutory right. Where the effect of the employer's inherently discriminatory conduct significantly impedes or interferes with the exercise of a statutory right, or threatens the viability of, or frustrates, a
statutory right, the conduct is inherently destructive. 1 Giving a
written warning to a steward for investigating a grievance does not
impose severe harm on the employee - a written warning being a
relatively insignificant infringement on employment - but it does significantly impede the exercise of a fundamental statutory right - the
administration of the collective bargaining agreement. 21
Without this right, protection of any preceding and supportive concerted activity becomes useless and a sham. Interfering with and
discriminating against a union steward for pursuing his responsibility in this respect, of necessity, has a significant effect upon employees and is inherently destructive of important employee rights,
for it threatens to reduce all of their protected activity to an exer215
cise in futility.
216 the employer
In Swift Independent Corporation,
closed its
plant because the union would not agree to a midterm modification
of the contract, with the intent of subsequently reopening the plant
under new terms and conditions of employment. The employer's conduct, designed to evade its obligations under its collective bargaining
agreement with the union, frustrated the process of collective bar217
gaining and therefore was inherently destructive.
United States Pipe & Foundry Company2 s presented a situation where the employer engaged in strikebaiting. The employer and
F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978); see supra note 184 and accompanying text.

212. Id. at 394-95.
213. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light, 641 F.2d 553, 559 (8th Cir. 1981); Haber-

man Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 1981); Swift Indep. Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 423

(1988).
214.

Consumers Power Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 183 (1979).

215. Id. at 187.
216.

289 N.L.R.B. 423 (1988).

217. Id. See also Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that termination of union employees to escape
economic obligations imposed by the collective bargaining agreement is inherently destructive).
218. 180 N.L.R.B. 325 (1969), enforced sub nom Local 155, Int'l Molders & Allied
Workers Union v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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union were at impasse over the terms of a new agreement when the
employer announced its intention to institute certain reductions in
benefits not at issue in the current negotiations, which would be rescinded upon the union's agreement to a new contract. The employer's purpose in reducing benefits was to bring economic pressure
on the employees to either agree to the employer's last proposal or to
strike during the winter months when work was slow. The employer's
conduct, aimed as it was at precipitating a strike, was found by the
administrative law judge to be "inimical to the statutory purposes
and reveals a purpose inconsistent with good-faith bargaining....
[such conduct] constitute[s] consequences visited on employees for
adhering to their Union [which] are 'inherently. . .prejudicial to
union interests.' "219 The court of appeals agreed with the administrative law judge's characterization of the conduct as inherently destructive. "To seek to force the Union's hand as here was done, by
action designed to control and to dilute the statutorily protected
strike initiative belonging to the Union, can reasonably be considered
as too prejudicial to employee rights and the bargaining process to
'220 The employer's conduct unescape the condemnation of the Act.
dermined the viability of the right to strike by attempting to control
the strike initiative which is a right vested exclusively in the
employees.
In attempting to assess the impact which certain employer conduct has on employee rights, particularly in reference to the right to
strike, Professor Estreicher has proposed the principle of "bounded
conflict. ' 221 His premise is that ". . .while economic conflict is an
essential, legitimate feature of our collective bargaining system, a
strike should ordinarily not provide an occasion for terminating the
a dispute,
bargaining relationship. The strike is a means of resolving
2 22 To the extent
not destroying the underlying bargaining structure.
that an employer's conduct threatens the survival of the bargaining
structure, it is inherently destructive.
An employer's inherently discriminatory conduct is inherently
destructive when it severely harms an employee due to loss of employment or a valuable employment benefit, or when its impact significantly interferes with the exercise of a statutory right or undermines the viability of a statutory right.
219. Id. at 328.
220.
221.

Local 155, Int'l Molders, 442 F.2d at 748.
Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287,288 (1987).

222. Id. at 288.
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C. Legitimate and Substantial Business Justification

One must consider what types of employer interests constitute
legitimate and substantial business justification. It is important to
keep in mind that certain interests which may be sufficient to justify
conduct that has a comparatively slight impact on employee rights

will not necessarily be deemed sufficient to outweigh an inherently
destructive impact.
Secondly, the use of the adjective "substantial" signifies that the
legitimate business justification must be "nonfrivolous. 22 3 Where
the proffered legitimate business justification is based on speculation
or is not reasonable, the justification will not be considered substantial. The employer may rely on a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement to justify inherently discriminatory conduct. This reliance
must be based on a reasonable and arguably correct interpretation of
the contract. 24 If the employer's contract interpretation is unreasonable, it does not rise to the level of a substantial business justification.225 Similarly, an employer's inherently discriminatory conduct of
refusing to make tuition benefits available to union officials, based on
its fear of possibly violating §8(a)(2) of the NLRA 226 and §302 of
the Labor Management Relations Act,227 was held to be violative of
§8(a)(3) since its fear of possibly violating these statutes was
unfounded. 28
223. Harter Equipment, 280 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 n.9 (1986) (stating. "[w]e do not regard the Court's reference to 'substantial' justification in Great Dane Trailers as meaning
anything more than nonfrivolous.").
224. Glover Bottled Gas Corp., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1989); Texaco, Inc., 285
N.L.R.B. 291 (1987).
225. See Texaco, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1988). The employer terminated the payment of accident and sickness benefits to strikers claiming the termination was justified by the
language of the contract. The Board found the employer's interpretation of the contract language unreasonable and since no justification existed for the inherently discriminatory conduct,
the employer violated §8(a)(3). Id. The employer's reliance on contract language to postpone
payment of vacation benefits to strikers, however, was found to be reasonable and therefore
constituted a legitimate and substantial business justification. Id.
226. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(2)(1982) (providing, in pertinent part, that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to contribute financial or other support to" a labor organization).
227. 29 U.S.C. §186 (1982) (prohibiting, inter alia, the payment of money by an employer to officers of any labor organization which represents the employer's employees, but
excepts any payment made as compensation by the employer to its employees).
228. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 197 N.L.R.B. 725. Compare Mullins Broadcasting Co.,
200 N.L.R.B. 119 with A.S. Abell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1979). In Mullins
Broadcasting Co., after a union organizing campaign commenced, the employer decided to
reduce labor costs by 10% by revising work schedules. 200 N.L.R.B. 119. Its justification for
this inherently discriminatory conduct was its belief that the union would win a representation
election. It wanted to build in some bargaining room so that when the union made wage demands in bargaining, the employer could agree without actually increasing its labor costs. Id.
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Legitimate business justifications tend to fall within one of three
categories: 1)justification based on managerial prerogative; 2)justification based on the employer's desire to gain or enhance its bargaining leverage; and 3)justification based on the effectuation of statutory policy. The majority of cases fall within the first category.
Managerial prerogative refers to that authority which an employer needs to possess in order to successfully manage and operate
its business. 2 The ability to rely on, and enforce, contractual rights
is a necessary adjunct to operating a business. Thus, an employer's
reliance on "nondiscriminatory contract interpretation that is reasonable and arguably correct . . . [is] sufficient to constitute a legiti' 230 While
mate and substantial business justification for its conduct.
the employer was relying on the contractual no-strike clause - legitimate business consideration - to justify its conduct in Metropolitan
Edison,2"' its justification was not sufficient because it was not substantial. Its interpretation of the no-strike clause as imposing an af32
firmative duty on union officials was unwarranted.
Successful operation of a business often depends on the ability
to protect confidential information. Thus, an employer's action based
on a legitimate need to protect confidential information from unauthorized disclosure constitutes a legitimate business justification. In
Raytheon Missile,23 3 the employer transferred an employee from the
Industrial Relations Department, where she had access to all the employer's personnel and labor relations data and policies, because she
The employer's justification, however, was based entirely on speculation - the representation
election had not been held and no wage demands had been made - and was therefore not a
substantial justification. Id.
In A.S.Abell, the employer adopted a policy not to employ any union member who had
previously worked for another newspaper until clarification was forthcoming concerning who
had been responsible for a riot which had occurred during a strike at the other paper, resulting
in physical violence and property damage. The employer feared a repetition of the damage at
its place of business. 598 F.2d 876. The court found the employer's fears were reasonable in
view of the difficulty of identifying those responsible for the riot, the fact that the investigation
into the issue of responsibility was continuing, and the prevailing uncertainty of the union's
trustworthiness. Thus the employer provided a substantial business justification for its inherently discriminatory conduct. Id.
See also NLRB v. Hudson Transit Lines, 429 F.2d 1223, 1231 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971) (stating that an employer defense based on probable strike was
no justification where possibility of strike was remote and tenuous).
229. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, How ARBITRATION WORKS 457-58 (4th ed.
1985).
230. Glover Bottled Gas Corp., 292 N.L.R.B. No. 99, slip op. at 3.
231. 460 U.S. 693. See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
232. Metropolitan Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 703-704. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of "substantial" justification).
233. Raytheon Missile Sys. Div., 279 N.L.R.B. 245 (1986).
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had attended a union meeting. The employer's conduct was inherently discriminatory - the decision to transfer being based solely on
participation in a union activity - but the employer established a legitimate and substantial business justification based on its desire to
avoid placing the employee in a conflict of interest which could jeopardize its confidential labor relations material. 23 4
Hiring employees qualified for the job is an essential aspect of
managerial prerogative. Even though a refusal to reinstate a striker
when a vacancy occurs is inherently destructive, an employer's interest in hiring qualified workers outweighs the harm to employee
rights where the employer shows that the striker lacks the requisite
skill to perform the job in question.23 5
An essential feature of managerial prerogative is that the authority claimed as a prerogative must be necessary to the management of the business. Ease of operation or convenience does not rise
to the level of managerial prerogative. An employer's proffered justification of administrative convenience for requiring replaced strikers
to execute a form semi-annually indicating their continued interest
in recall was not sufficient to establish a legitimate business justification.230 Likewise, an employer's desire to avoid dissension among the
workers did not present a legitimate business justification for a pay
differential between strikers and nonstrikers.237
A second type of justification is based on the employer's desire
to gain or enhance its bargaining leverage. The Supreme Court considered the legitimacy of such a justification in American Ship.285
The Court noted that an employer's actions taken simply to support
its bargaining position should be distinguished from actions indicating a hostility to the collective bargaining process. "[B]ringing economic pressure to bear in support of [a] legitimate bargaining position" is a legitimate business justification sufficient to justify
employer conduct which does not have an inherently destructive impact on employee rights.2 9
In Kaiser Steel240 the employer's machinists furnished their own
tools which they stored at the plant. Normally, the employees were
allowed to take their tools home if they needed them to do work
234.
235.

Id.
Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968).

236. See Vitronic Div. of Penn Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 45(1978), enfd, 630 F.2d 561 (8th
Cir. 1979).
237.
238.

See Huck Mfg. Co., 693 F.2d 1176.
380 U.S. 300 (1965). See supra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.

239. 380 U.S. at 318.
240. NLRB v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 700 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1983).
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away from the plant. During the strike, however, the employer refused to allow the employees to remove their tools. The purpose for
its policy was the desire to achieve leverage in collective bargaining. 241 Although the employer's policy was inherently discriminatory
- sequential discrimination in treatment before and after the employees engaged in union activity - its impact was found to be comparatively slight.242 The court held that the employer's intention to put
a legitimate buspressure on the union during bargaining constituted
243
Ship.
American
to
citing
justification,
iness
A final category of justification is based on effectuation of statutory policy. In this circumstance, the employer claims that while its
conduct may adversely impact the exercise of a statutory right, it is
justified because its conduct is also serving to effectuate a statutory
policy. The benefit to statutory interests gained from the conduct
outweighs any disadvantages to statutory rights which the conduct
may cause.
In the Brown Food case,244 the Supreme Court determined that
the employers' conduct in locking out their employees and continuing operations with replacement workers had, under the circumstances, a comparatively slight impact on employee rights. It then
considered the employers' justification - the conduct was designed as
a defensive measure to preserve the integrity of the multi-employer
bargaining group from the destructive effect of the union's whipsaw
246
strike.245 The Court cited to its opinion in Buffalo Linen wherein
it had discussed the role of multi-employer bargaining units as "a
vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of promoting
' 247 The
labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining.
Court found that the employer's conduct was "reasonably adapted to
the achievement of a legitimate end" and accordingly not in viola241.

Without their tools, the machinists would find it extremely difficult to obtain tem-

porary employment with another employer for the duration of the strike. Id. Losing the ability
to supplement their incomes during a strike pressured the employees to capitulate sooner. Id.
at 577.
242. The court determined the impact was only comparatively slight because the policy
had no long-term effect on the strikers, it did not significantly interfere with the right to strike,
and the union could have avoided any impact altogether simply by telling the employees to
take their tools with them before the strike started. Id. at 577.

243.
244.
245.
246.
(1957)).
247.

Id. at 577 n.3.
380 U.S. at 287-88. See supra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
Id. at 284, 289.
Id. at 289 n.4 (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87
Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 95.
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tion of §8(a)(3). 48
A statutory justification was also proffered by the employer to
justify superseniority for union stewards in Dairylea.249 The employer and union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
containing a clause which awarded superseniority to union stewards
for all contractual benefits. The superseniority clause was inherently
discriminatory. It tied the grant of a benefit to a worker's status as a
union officer. The foreseeable effect was to encourage employees to
be good union members so as to qualify for union office and thus be
eligible for the enefit.2 50 This effect was also inherently destructive.
Employees who are not union stewards lose a valuable benefit - their
relative seniority standing which controls layoffs, recalls and other
contract benefits, similar to the loss suffered by the employees in
Erie Resistor.2 "1 The statutory right to refrain from engaging in
union activities is significantly hampered. Tying a valuable benefit to
engaging in union activities deters employees from refraining from
such activities. 252 This inherently destructive effect, 253 however, is
outweighed by the legitimate and substantial statutory objectives
served by the grant of superseniority limited to layoff and recall:
The lawfulness of such restricted superseniority is, however, based
on the ground that it furthers the effective administration of bargaining agreements on the plant level by encouraging the continued
presence of the steward on the job. It thereby not only serves a
legitimate statutory purpose but also redounds in its effects to the
benefit of all unit employees. Thus, superseniority for layoff and
recall has a proper aim and such discrimination as it may create is
simply an incidental side effect of a more general benefit accorded
all employees.2a

The Dairylea case went beyond merely recognizing that inherently destructive conduct may be justified when it also serves to effectuate a statutory policy. It also implicitly noted that a justification
248. Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 289.
249. 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975). The union was also charged with a violation of §8(b)(2),
250. Id.
251. 373 U.S. 221 (1963). See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
252. Cf., Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) (imposing penalties on employees
for holding union office inhibits employees from holding office and is inherently destructive).
See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text..
253. But see Local 1384, UAW v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 482, 494 (7th Cir. 1985)("[w]e do

not, of course, decide that superseniority preferences [for union stewards] are inherently destructive"); NLRB v. American Can Co., 658 F.2d 746, 756 (10th Cir. 1981)("[t]he conflict

here [superseniority for union stewards] is not so inherently destructive of important employee
rights that it should be held to be unlawful in spite of legitimate justification.").
254. Dairylea, 219 N.L.R.B. at 658 (footnote omitted).
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is legitimate and substantial only to the extent that the inherently
discriminatory conduct is narrowly tailored to achieve the proffered
justification. The justification for superseniority was to ensure the
presence of the union steward at the worksite so that he would be
available to resolve contractual grievances as they arose. Superseniority for layoff and recall purposes is directly related to ensuring the
steward's continued presence in the work place. Superseniority for
other contract benefits - vacation time or job assignments - is not

related to the steward's presence and does nothing to further the
claimed justification. That aspect255of the superseniority clause in
Dairylea was, therefore, unlawful.
The proposition that a business justification is legitimate and
substantial only to the extent that the conduct in question is directly
related to, and narrowly tailored to serve, the justification has been
relied on by the Board in subsequent cases.25 6 In Gulton ElectroVoice, Inc.,257 the superseniority clause was limited to layoff and recall, but those eligible for superseniority included not only the union
steward but seven other union officers. The Board found that this
extension of superseniority was beyond the scope of the asserted jus25 8
tification for its existence, and, therefore, in violation of §8(a)(3).
It is the immediacy of attention that stewards can offer that place
the stewards in such a special position. Further, steward job-retention superseniority is necessary to the steward's ability to carry out
the primary duties of their union position. However, superseniority
is inherently discriminatory and the steward's need to maintain an
on-the-job presence does not generally apply to officers; thus the
officers generally justification used for stewards does not extend2 to
19
duties.
steward-like
perform
latter
the
unless
In Freezer Queen Foods, Inc.,260 at the conclusion of the strike
the employer reinstated the strikers but treated probationary employees who had gone out on strike as new hires. The employer
255. Id. at 658-59.
256. See Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local

900, Int'l Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); George
Banta Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1981), enforced, 686 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1082 (1983); Freezer Queen Foods, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 330 (1980); Moore Business
Forms, 224 N.L.R.B. 393 (1976), enforced in part and rev'd in part, 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.

1978).
257.

266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983), enfd sub nom. Local 900, Int'l Union of Electrical

Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
258.

266 N.L.R.B. at 409.

259. Id. at 408.
260.

249 N.L.R.B. 330 (1980).
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pointed to the collective bargaining agreement providing that new
hires were to be treated as probationary employees for a 60-day period before being awarded regular employee status. If a probationer
missed seven consecutive work days he lost any time accumulated
toward the 60-day goal. The employer argued that since the probationary employees had missed more than seven days due to the strike
they had to start the probation period over again. The purpose of the
probation period was to allow the employer time to observe and evaluate new employees to determine whether they were qualified for
permanent employment. Hiring qualified employees has been recognized as a managerial prerogative and thus a legitimate business justification. The Board held, however, that the employer in this case
had failed to advance a legitimate and substantial business justification.2 61 The employer offered no reason why tolling the probation
period during the strike would not serve its purpose. The employer's
conduct in treating the probationers as new hires was not narrowly
tailored to achieve its stated justification. "Respondent has not established that this policy, as opposed to other less destructive policies
which would achieve the same end of allowing observations of new
employees for a substantial uninterrupted period of time, serves any
legitimate or substantial business or economic purpose. "262
A similar result was reached in Moore Business Forms.6 3 The
employer changed a rotating shift assignment policy to a fixed assignment policy which resulted in the replacements and cross-overs
being assigned to the best shifts and the full-term strikers being permanently assigned the least desirable shifts. The administrative law
judge noted that while this change "may well have been justified as
a temporary exigency by the reduced number of employees and the
need to train replacements during the strike, there was no showing
that, once the work force was stabilized and trained, the continuation of the fixed shifts" was necessary. 2 4 Thus, the employer failed
to establish a business justification for its inherently discriminatory
and destructive conduct and was found to have violated §8(a)(3). 211
261.

Id. at 331.

262. Id. (footnote omitted). This concept is analogous to the lesser discriminatory alternative aspect of the adverse impact theory in employment discrimination law. Under Title VII,
a facially neutral employment practice which adversely impacts on a protected group, even if
justified by a legitimate business purpose, is unlawful if a lesser discriminatory alternative
exists which would equally serve the stated business purpose. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 462 (1989).
263. 224 N.L.R.B. 393. See also supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.

264. Moore, 224 N.L.R.B. at 407.
265. Id. at 408.
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This rationale was also relied on by the administrative law
judge in rejecting the employer's asserted justification in George
Banta Co.266 The employer instituted a preferential reinstatement
system after the strike. Under this system, cross-overs were reinstated to their pre-strike jobs, irrespective of what job they had performed during the strike. Then full-term strikers were reinstated to
remaining jobs based on seniority. The employer offered several justifications based on managerial prerogative interests - placing crossovers in jobs and departments with which they were familiar, avoiding retraining and constant bumping and controlling rate retention. 267 The administrative law judge noted, however, that "management could have achieved essentially these same business objectives
without drawing a line of demarcation between 'cross-over' and returning striker. 12 68 The system was found to violate §8(a)(3).
Recognized justification for inherently discriminatory conduct
generally falls into one of three categories - managerial prerogative,
bargaining leverage and effectuation of statutory policy. The justification must not only be legitimate but also substantial, which requires that the justification be nonfrivolous, reasonable and nonspeculative. Lastly, the conduct being justified must be directly
related to, and narrowly tailored to achieve, the asserted
justification.
D. Balancing Conflicting Interests
Assuming the employer has established a legitimate and substantial business justification, the Board may still find a violation of
§8(a)(3) if the employer's inherently discriminatory conduct is inherently destructive and the Board determines that the proffered justification does not outweigh the destructive impact on employee
rights. This latter task requires the Board to engage in a balancing
of conflicting interests.
This is an area which has a minimum of specific guidelines and
allows a maximum measure of discretionary action. The purpose behind the balancing of interests is to find that result which best effec266. 256 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1981), enforced, 686 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1082 (1983).
267. 256 N.L.R.B. at 1220.

268. Id. See also Raytheon Missile Sys. Div., 279 N.L.R.B. 245 (1986); supra notes
233-34 and accompanying text. In upholding the employer's justification of preserving confidential business information against a claim that the transfer of an employee violated
§8(a)(3), the Board noted that the job to which the employee was transferred constituted a
promotion with an attendant increase in pay. The employer achieved its business purpose with
the least possible harm to the employee. Id. at 248.
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1 9 That is not to imply that employee
tuates national labor policy.26
statutory rights always outweigh the employer's legitimate and substantial business justifications. National labor policy recognizes that
the rights granted to employees under the Act "are not unlimited in
the sense that they can be exercised without regard to any duty

which the existence of rights in others may place upon . . . [the]
employee[s] .270

The responsibility for engaging in this balancing of interests resides primarily in the Board, subject to limited judicial review. 271 So
long as the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence 272
and adequately and rationally explained2 73 its judgment should be
upheld.
Congress, in enacting the NLRA, did not attempt to exhaustively detail the rights and responsibilities of the respective parties.
Its purpose in creating a specialized administrative agency such as
the National Labor Relations Board was to take advantage of the
specialized labor relations experience of the members of the Board,
who would interpret and apply the general provisions of the Act to
the peculiar complexities of industrial life. 274 The Board's role is to
carefully appraise the competing interests in light of the particular
circumstances involved, and apply its special understanding of the
realities of industrial relations, in order to arrive at a result which
will best effectuate national labor policy. 275
Beyond these broad generalities, there is little specific direction
provided for the Board, or by the Board, as to how to perform this
appraisal. At least one court has suggested that where the balance
between the two interests is a close question, "evidence concerning
the motivation of the employer would become an important element. '2 78 This proposal may have merit when the employer's justification is based on statutory rights, but if the balance is between statutorily protected interests and business interests, a close call should
weigh in favor of employee statutory rights.
Unfortunately, a consideration of those cases where the balancing test was used does not present much instruction in applying the
269.
270.
271.
272.

Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 236.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 96.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-91 (1951).

273.

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).

274. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 800.
275.

Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 236.

276. NLRB v. National Seal, 336 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1964).
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test.27 The discussion tends to be conclusory, often noting merely
that the claimed business justification does not outweigh the harm to
employee rights, without stating why.218 The Board in Erie Resistor
considered the employer's claim of necessity - a managerial prerogative justification that the offer of superseniority was necessary in order to procure strike replacements which in turn was necessary in
order to continue successfully operating its business during the strike
- and found that it did not outweigh the harm to employee rights.
Surely every employer faced with a strike, or any other form of
union activity, will be first concerned with the well-being of his
business. There is, moreover, no doubt that a strike may increase
the intensity of this concern, for the primary purpose of most
strikes is to apply economic pressure to strengthen the union's bargaining demands. But we do not believe that the effectiveness of a
strike, or the difficulty an employer may have in securing replaceform of preferred treatment here
ments, can sanction the pervasive
2
utilized by the Employer. 7
In Bechtel Corp.,280 the court agreed with the Board that the
employer's legitimate business justification did not outweigh the
harm to employee rights. The employer's decision to hire only union
members who were in the majority faction of the union, rather than
dissidents, was prompted by a desire to avoid both dissension among
the work force and probable work stoppages, 2 1 and to secure a sufficient labor supply. 2 2 But this managerial interest in operating the
business could not outweigh the harm done to the dissidents by denying them employment based on the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
On the other hand, some managerial prerogatives will outweigh
the harmful effects of some types of inherently destructive conduct.
While a refusal to reinstate an economic striker to a vacant position
is inherently destructive, if the refusal is based on a change in operation resulting in the striker no longer being qualified for the job, the
277. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (holding that the
function of striking the balance is difficult and delicate and should be left primarily to the
National Labor Relations Board).
278. See Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 236-37.
279. Erie Resistor, 132 N.L.R.B. at 630 (footnotes omitted).
280. 328 F.2d 28. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
281. This justification was reasonable and not speculative. Previously, the employer had
hired two dissidents and the other workers had gone on strike. 328 F.2d at 37.
282. The supply of dissidents was not sufficient to man the job. Id. at 37 n. 7. If the
employer continued to hire regardless of union politics, there were not enough workers who
would work with the dissidents to complete the project. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

49

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 8:2

conduct is justified and therefore not a violation of §8(a)(3). 2 "3 That
justification, unlike the ones offered in Erie Resistor and Bechtel,
actually changes the nature of the employer's conduct. Before the
justification is offered, the evidence suggests that the striker used to
work for the employer, the employer needs to hire a worker, but instead of hiring the employee who engaged in a strike it hires a stranger who did not strike. This decision, on its face, appears to be based
on strike activity. By proving a justification, however, the refusal to
reinstate is no longer inherently discriminatory because now the basis for the employer's decision is lack of qualification for the job, not
union activity. Whereas, in Erie Resistor and Bechtel, the employer's justification does not change the nature of its conduct. The
award of superseniority is still based on strike activity and job opportunities are still based on union political beliefs.
Justification based on bargaining leverage will not outweigh the
harm caused by inherently destructive conduct. As discussed previously,28 4 the Supreme Court considered the legitimacy of this justification in American Ship and held that it was sufficient to justify
employer conduct which was not inherently destructive. 25 The Court
in American Ship did not find the employer's conduct inherently destructive - the impact of the employer's act did not destroy the
union's ability to effectively represent the workers nor frustrate the
bargaining process. 286 But, where the impact of the employer's conduct is inherently destructive, the desire to gain bargaining leverage
is no longer a sufficient justification. The impact of the employer's
conduct has fallen outside the "bounded conflict. 281 The destructive
impact indicates a hostility to the process of collective bargaining - it
significantly impedes the exercise of, or frustrates, a basic statutory
right.288
That the desire to gain bargaining leverage as asserted justification is treated differently when the impact of employer conduct is
comparatively slight as opposed to inherently destructive is based on
the difference in the Board's role of assessing justification when the
impact differs. In a comparatively slight situation, the Board's only
role is to determine whether the justification is legitimate and sub283. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968).
284. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
285. American Ship, 380 U.S. at 318.
286. Id. at 309.
287. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
288. See generally, Estreicher, supra note 236, at 288 (suggesting that when a party's
conduct falls outside of the "bounded conflict" it is actually ignoring the rules established to
guarantee that the bargaining structure lasts throughout the conflict).
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stantial. The desire to gain bargaining leverage is substantial in that
it is both reasonable and nonspeculative - the parties have not
reached agreement, indicating that the employer's current bargaining leverage is insufficient to persuade the union to agree to its proposals. The legitimacy of this objective was recognized by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union:
"The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system
that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized." 289
Having determined that the justification is both legitimate and
substantial, the Board's role in a comparatively slight case is at an
end. Unless there is independent proof of antiunion animus, there is
no violation of §8(a)(3). The Board is not empowered, in this situation, to act as an "arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands."290 Nevertheless, that is precisely the type of authority which
the Board is given in inherently destructive cases. In such situations,
the use of economic weapons which are inherently prejudicial to
union interests give the employer too much power. Unlike the comparatively slight case where the use of the economic weapon can be
viewed as "part and parcel" of the collective bargaining process, the
use of such weapons which are inherently destructive exceed the limits of "bounded conflict." 291 "[T]here are limits to the weapons the
parties may use, precisely because of the devastating impact particular tactics would have on the continuation of the bargaining relationship at the strike's conclusion. 292
Likewise, the court in Local 155, Molders determined that the
employer's conduct had an inherently destructive impact and the
employer's interest in gaining bargaining leverage by bringing pressure on the union did not outweigh the harm done to employee
rights.2 93
289. 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1990).
290. Id. at 497.
291. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 236 at 288.
292. Id.
293. Local 155, Int'l Molders & Allied Workers Union v. NLRB 442 F.2d 742, 746
(D.C. Cir. 1971). See also International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 88 v. N.L.R.B., 858 F.2d
at 767-68 (stating that "if the employer's conduct is not inherently destructive. . .then there is
no violation. . .when the employer's purpose is 'merely to bring about a settlement of a labor
dispute on favorable terms.' "); Kaiser Steel Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 643 (1981), enforcment denied, 700 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1983). The administrative law judge, whose decision was adopted
by the Board, found that the employer's desire to achieve bargaining leverage did not outweigh
the inherently destructive effect of its conduct. The court denied enforcement based on its
finding that the impact of the employer's conduct was only comparatively slight and therefore
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Inherently destructive conduct justified by the effectuation of
statutory policy can outweigh the harm to employee rights. As the
Board stated in Dairylea, such conduct has a proper aim and the
detrimental effect it creates is only a side effect of the advantages
gained from the conduct. 94
The easier balancing cases involve justification based on bargaining leverage, which will not outweigh the harm caused, or statutory policy, which will probably outweigh the harm. Justification
based on managerial prerogatives continues to require the Board to
bring to bear its specialized expertise and evaluate each situation in
light of the complexities of modern industrial relations.
III.

APPLYING THE DOCTRINE

The issue presented in Harter Equipment, Inc.,2 5 was whether
an employer violates §8(a)(3) if it locks out its employees and hires
temporary replacements solely for the purpose of bringing economic
pressure to bear in support of a legitimate bargaining position. The
employer and the union had an eight year bargaining relationship.
During negotiation for a new agreement, the employer told the union
it was experiencing major financial problems and was going to be
seeking wage reductions and changes in the union security clause.
The union opposed the proposed changes, offering instead to extend
the current agreement for six months. The employer rejected any
contract extension and informed the union it would not let the employees work without a contract. When the employer and union were
unable to reach agreement on a new contract upon expiration of the
old one, the employer locked out the employees. Approximately a
month and a half later, the employer hired temporary replacements.
As of the date of the administrative hearing in the case (a year
later) the employer was still operating with temporary
replacements.296
InternationalBrotherhoodof Boilermakers, Local 88 v. NLRB
(NationalGypsum),29 7 presented the same legal question as Harter
Equipment but with slightly different facts. In this case, the employer and union had a nearly 40 year bargaining relationship.
a desire to achieve bargaining leverage was a legitimate and substantial business justification.
See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.

294.

219 N.L.R.B. at 658. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.

295. 280 NLRB 597 (1986), afl'd sub nom Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3rd Cir. 1987).

296.

280 N.L.R.B. at 597. Indeed, five years later, the employer was still operating with

temporary replacements. Harter Equip., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1989).
297. 858 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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When their contract expired, the parties were still at odds over a
wage increase, insurance cost containment and a management rights
clause. As a result of the inability to reach an agreement, the employer locked out the employees and for the first six weeks continued
operations using supervisory and non-unit personnel. After six weeks,
the employer hired temporary replacements to continue operations.
Three months later, the parties resolved their differences and exeThe lockout ended and the regular employcuted a new agreement.
298
work.
to
ees returned
The Board's decision in Harter Equipment is based on the inherently discriminatory doctrine and begins with an examination of
the Supreme Court's lockout cases, American Ship and Brown
Food.2 9 An initial flaw in the use of these cases is the attempt to
build a syllogism based on a faulty major premise. The Board majority reasoned that since American Ship sanctioned employer lockouts,
whether for offensive or defensive purposes, in the absence of antiunion motive, and Brown Food found the use of temporary replacements during a defensive lockout under the particular facts of that
case lawful, therefore employer lockouts utilizing temporary replacements do not violate the Act.300 The majority's unspoken assumption
in its interpretation of American Ship is that all lockouts, whether
offensive or defensive, are the same; that they are treated alike for
all purposes.
Thus, what an employer is allowed to do in a defensive lockout
(Brown Food), it is allowed to do in an offensive lockout (Harter
Equipment). The flaw in this syllogism is the Board's interpretation
of American Ship. To say that offensive lockouts are legal as well as
defensive lockouts, is not to say that they are alike or should be
treated the same for all purposes.
Secondly, the Board concluded that since the Court found the
use of temporary replacements in Brown Food to have only a comparatively slight effect on employee rights, the use of temporary
replacements during lockouts under any circumstances (in the absence of antiunion animus) only has a comparatively slight effect.30 1
Lastly, the Board found that since the employer's conduct has
only a comparatively slight effect on employee rights, its reliance on
a desire to enhance its bargaining leverage is a legitimate and sub298. Id. at 758-759.
299. 280 N.L.R.B. at 597-99. The decision was 3-1, with Chairman Dotson and Members Johansen and Babson in the majority and Member Dennis in dissent.
300. Id. at 598-99.
301. Id at 599-600.
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stantial business justification sufficient to require proof of antiunion
30 2
motive in order to sustain a violation of §8(a)(3).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also analyzed National Gypsum under the inherently discriminatory doctrine.3 0 3 The
court determined that the employer's conduct was not inherently destructive, concluding, consistent with the Board's Harter Equipment
analysis, that this finding is compelled by the Supreme Court decisions in American Ship and Brown Food.304 As the effect of the employer's conduct was only comparatively slight, the employer's interest in bringing economic pressure to bear in support of its bargaining
position is a legitimate and substantial business justification for its
30 5
conduct.
An analysis of the decisions reached in these two cases requires
another look at the Court's holding in American Ship.3 06 The Court
noted that in the past the Board had classified lockouts based on the
purpose behind the tactic. An employer lockout in response to union
tactics which would interfere with legitimate managerial prerogatives - a defensive lockout - was deemed permissible by the Board.
Lockouts designed to prevent plant seizures, sabotage, quickie strikes
or to preserve the integrity of a multi-employer bargaining unit, were
defensive in nature and therefore allowed.30 7 Lockouts initiated by
the employer solely as a means of bringing economic pressure to
bear on the union or to'preempt a union strike (where such a strike
would not cause other than the normal disruptions to an employer's
business which are the usual accompaniments to a strike) - an offensive lockout - were held by the Board to be prohibited by the Act as
infringing on the collective bargaining rights of employees.308
The Court noted that the Board justified this classification, with
its attendant distinction in treatment, on the basis of its "special
competence to weigh the competing interests of employer and employees and to accommodate these interests according to its expert
judgment."3 0 9 The problem with the Board's analysis, according to
the Court, was that its ability to weigh these competing interests
rests upon a finding that. the employer has engaged in both inherently discriminatory and inherently destructive conduct. Such a find302.
303.
304.

Id. at 600.
858 F.2d at 761.
Id. at 764.

305. Id. at 767.
306.
307.

380 U.S. 300. See supra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
Id. at 307.

308. Id. at 306-07.
309.

Id. at 315.
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ing was missing in this case. The Court found the employer's conduct neither inherently discriminatory nor destructive. 1 '
The Court did not equate offensive and defensive lockouts for
all purposes, nor did it hold that such distinctions are always irrelevant. It merely held that where the employer's conduct was neither
inherently discriminatory nor destructive, there was no occasion for
the Board to weigh competing interests. The lockout under consideration in American Ship was neither inherently discriminatory nor
destructive, nor were lockouts per se specifically forbidden by the
Act. Therefore the Board had no authority to find it violative of the
Act in the absence of antiunion motive merely because the Board
311
considered the lockout to be too powerful an economic weapon.
The Court specifically reinforced Erie Resistor, stating that its
holding in American Ship was "not to deny that there are some
practices which are inherently so prejudicial to union interests and so
devoid of significant economic justification that no specific evidence
1 2 Thus,
of intent to discourage union membership. . .is required."
while an employer lockout, standing alone, is allowed (in the absence
of antiunion animus), that is not to say that employer inherently discriminatory conduct engaged in in connection with a lockout could
not create a situation inherently destructive of employee interests.
13
The Court was presented with such a situation in Brown Food.
In Brown Food, the Board held that an otherwise lawful defensive lockout was rendered unlawful by the hiring of temporary
replacements for the locked out workers. 31 4 Not only was such conduct inherently discriminatory, it was also inherently destructive.
The Supreme Court agreed that the conduct was inherently discriminatory - a finding it had not been willing to make in American Ship
with regard to the lockout alone - but disagreed-that the impact was
inherently destructive. Having determined that the impact was comparatively slight, the Court required the employer to advance a legitimate business justification - a burden not placed on the employer in
American Ship. At the very least, these cases suggest that not all
lockouts are equal.31 5 Under some circumstances an employer's conduct in connection with a lockout can be inherently discriminatory
310. Id.
311.

Id. at 312-13, 317.

312. Id. at 311.
313. 380 U.S. 278. See supra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
314. Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 280.
315. Id. at 289.
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and require a justification.3 16
If all lockouts are not treated equally, then the fact that the use
of temporary replacements during a defensive lockout under the particular facts of Brown Food had only a comparatively slight impact
does not afortiorilead to the same conclusion with regard to the use
of temporaries under all circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary to
determine whether the considerations which led the Court to find the
impact comparatively slight in Brown Food would lead to the same
conclusion in a case involving an offensive lockout.
The first fact which the Court considered in deciding the impact
was the very fact that the use of replacements "was all part and
parcel of respondents' defensive measure to preserve the multiemployer group in the face of the whipsaw strike. ' 31 7 The Court specifically relied upon the type of lockout in determining the impact of the
conduct.3 18
Secondly, the Court refused to rely on the fact that the use of
temporary rather than regular employees to perform the work implied a hostile motivation. The Court did not believe that the regular
employees were actually willing to perform the work. It found the
employees' motive to be a "desire to further the objective of the
whipsaw strike."3 19 Requiring the employer to give its regular employees the work under these circumstances in effect forces the employer "to aid[] and abet[] the success of the whipsaw strike. ' 320 In
an offensive lockout situation, on the other hand, the employees do
want to continue working and they are being denied work solely because they are presenting bargaining demands through a statutorily
chosen collective bargaining representative.
The Court next noted that since replacements were only temporary, the regular employees could not have viewed them as threatening their jobs. 321 As the facts in Harter Equipment show, however,
the use of temporary replacements in an offensive lockout context is
not necessarily temporary in duration. 2 2 In Harter Equipment, the
temporaries have been employed for five years, and, as the employer
testified, "The only employees that I recognize now are those employees that are there, that are working at the company. . .nobody
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 287.
380 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added).
Id. at 283.

319. Id. at 285.
320.

Id. The Board has long recognized that the employer is not required to finance a

strike against itself. See General Electric Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 510 (1948).
321. 380 U.S. at 288.
322. See Harter Equip., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. No. 79, slip op. at 2 (1989).
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from five years ago. ''1 2 Conduct can have an inherently destructive
impact when it causes severe harm to employees, such as the loss of
3 24
The denial of an
employment or valuable employment benefits.
employment opportunity to employees willing to work clearly constitutes the loss of a valuable employment benefit.
The last two factors considered by the Court in Brown Food
were the fact that union members, through their control of union
policy, could end the dispute by agreeing to the employer's terms,
and, the fact that the employer's proposals included a union security
3 25
clause thus providing no incentive for employees to quit the union.
The analysis of these two issues by the Court was based on the thencurrent contours of the concepts of union membership and Section 7
rights, which concepts have been clarified, and more emphasis been
placed 6on the right to refrain from union activity, since Brown
32
Food.
The Court in Brown Food failed to give sufficient consideration
to the employees' right to refrain from union activity. In a lockout,
the employer locks out the entire bargaining unit, not just the union
members.32 7 Unlike a strike, where those employees who do not
agree with the union's demands can remain at work, in a lockout all
employees, whether they agree with the union or not, are affected.
Union members, moreover, are the only individuals who have the
ability to control union policy - a situation implicitly acknowledged
by the Court in its statement that "the membership, through its control of union policy, could end the dispute and terminate the lockout
at any time simply by agreeing to the employers' terms .. ,,328
Nonmembers have no such ability to control union policy and are
unable to end the dispute outside of union channels since the employer is prohibited from engaging in direct dealing by bargaining
individually with employees. 329 The effect of the lockout on nonunion
employees, therefore, is to encourage them to join the union so that
they may exercise some control over ending the lockout.
While the Court relied on the presence of a union security
clause for finding that the employer's conduct could not have the
323. Id. at 3.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 203-12.
325. Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 288-89.
326. See Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Pattern
Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
327. See Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 286 (implying that, if the employer locked out only
union members, it would constitute inherently discriminatory and destructive conduct).
328. Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
329. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944).
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effect of discouraging union membership since the employees "would
have nothing to gain, and much to lose, by quitting the union,"38 0 a
union security clause does not require that employees maintain
membership status in the union. It merely imposes an obligation to
contribute financially to union activities related to collective bargaining.3 31 The presence of a union security clause is legally irrelevant to
whether or not an employee will become or remain a member of the
union. 332 Employer conduct that would tend to discourage union
membership will have that effect even where there is a union security
clause.
As the Court's rationale for finding the impact of the employer's
conduct in Brown Food to be comparatively slight can be distinguished from cases involving an offensive lockout with replacements,
it is necessary to independently evaluate the circumstances in the
latter situation to determine whether the impact of the conduct is
inherently destructive.
Conduct is inherently destructive if it severely harms employees
for exercising their rights or severely impacts on statutory rights.333
The use of temporary replacements in conjunction with offensive
lockouts has both effects. The employees lose a valuable employee
benefit - the opportunity to be employed and earn wages. This opportunity is being denied to them because they have chosen a union to
bargain on their behalf. Unlike a lockout alone, where no work is
being performed and the employer's operation is shut down, when
replacements are hired, there is work available which the regular
employees are denied the opportunity to perform. Even if this lost
opportunity does not last for years - as was the case in Harter quipment33 4 - but only weeks or months, the loss of earnings is permanent and can never be recovered. Loss of employment would seem to
be as inherently destructive as loss of a one-time vacation payment 8
33 6
or a tuition refund.
The conduct also severely impacts on statutory rights. It significantly interferes with an employee's right to refrain from union
membership. The only way to end the lockout is to reach agreement
with the employer which can only be done through the union as bar330.
331.
NLRB v.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Brown Food, 380 U.S. at 289.
See Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); see also
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986).
NLRB v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 603 F.2d 610 (1979).
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 725 (1972).
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gaining agent for the employees. If an employee desires to influence
the union, he needs to be a union member so that he can participate
in shaping union policy.
The employer's conduct also impacts on the right to strike.
Whereas a lockout alone only affects the timing and duration of the
strike, a lockout with replacements renders the right to strike illusory. With a lockout only, the employer is effectively shut down - the
same effect accomplished by a strike; only the timing of the shutdown and its duration is taken away from the employees. A lockout
with replacements, however, prevents the employees from accomplishing the purpose of a strike in toto - the employer's operation
continues uninterrupted.
Most importantly, the lockout with replacements severely impedes the right to engage in collective bargaining - the central purpose for which the Act was passed, other rights contained in the Act
being means to effectuate that purpose. When and if the lockout
ends, how will it effect the future willingness of employees to present
their demands through a union? The employees have witnessed firsthand the results of engaging in collective bargaining through a
union. They are thrown out of work and can only return when they
agree to the employer's proposals. It makes no sense to have a union
bargaining agent and lose wages when the end result is the same as
when no union is present. In the latter case they work under the
employer's terms but there is no interim loss of work. Although employees lose wages during a strike and sometimes lose the strike, capitulating to the employer's terms, it is a voluntary decision on the
employees' part to engage in the strike as part of the collective bargaining process. A lockout with replacements, on the other hand, is
seen by the workers as the imposition of punishment for engaging in
collective bargaining.
Thus, because of the severe impact on the employees and on the
exercise of statutory rights, an offensive lockout coupled with the use
of temporary replacements is inherently destructive. Once this conclusion is reached, the Board is then confronted with the relatively
easy task of deciding whether the employer's desire for bargaining
leverage outweighs the inherently destructive impact of the conduct.
This balance has already been struck and the answer is a resounding
no. Even the court in its decision in National Gypsum noted that
justification based on bargaining leverage is sufficient to condone an
employer's discriminatory conduct if it does not have an inherently
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destructive impact.33 7

Applying the inherently discriminatory doctrine to Harter
Equipment and National Gypsum requires the conclusion, contrary
to that reached by the respective tribunals, that an employer offensive lockout with the use of temporary replacements constitutes inherently discriminatory conduct having an inherently destructive impact on employee rights and cannot be justified merely by the
employer's desire to gain bargaining leverage during negotiations.
Such conduct violates §8(a)(3).
IV.

CONCLUSION

The inherently discriminatory doctrine has been well developed
through a series of Supreme Court cases beginning with Radio Officers and was best summarized in the Court's opinion in Great
Dane."' Employer conduct which is inherently discriminatory carries its own indicia of intent. The employer is held to have intended
the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its conduct. When the
impact of inherently discriminatory conduct on employee rights is
comparatively slight, the employer can justify its conduct by producing evidence of a legitimate and substantial business justification.
Such a justification undermines the inference of hostile motive, and a
specific finding of antiunion animus is required in order to find that
the employer's conduct violated §8(a)(3).119 If the impact of the conduct is inherently destructive, however, a finding of a violation of
§8(a)(3) can be sustained even in the face of employer proof of a
legitimate and substantial business justification if it is determined
that the harm to employee rights outweighs the proffered
justification.34 0
Understanding this doctrine requires a grasp of certain key concepts. Inherently discriminatory conduct is that conduct which, on
its face, makes a difference in treatment among employees based on
the exercise of §7 rights. This difference in treatment can manifest
itself simultaneously, sequentially or through adverse impact. The effect of inherently discriminatory conduct is inherently destructive
when it either severely harms an employee by causing the loss of a
valuable employment benefit, or by granting an employment benefit,
because of the exercise by the employee of his statutory rights, or
337.
338.
339.

International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 858 F.2d at 768.
388 U.S. 26 (1967).
Id. at 33 (stating that "the finding of a violation [of 8(a)(3)] normally turns on

whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an antiunion purpose.").
340.

Id. at 33-34.
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significantly impedes or frustrates the exercise of a statutory right.
The justification offered for such conduct must be both substantial and legitimate. A justification is substantial if it is nonfrivolous reasonable and not based on speculation. A justification is legitimate
if it generally falls into one of three categories: managerial prerogatives, desire to gain bargaining leverage, or effectuation of a statutory policy.
There are no clear guidelines instructing the Board in its job of
balancing interests. What is required is an analysis and weighing,
based on the Board's specialized expertise, of the competing interests, in light of national labor policy and the complexities of industrial reality.
Applying the inherently discriminatory doctrine to situations involving offensive lockouts with the use of temporary replacements
leads to the conclusion that such conduct is both inherently discriminatory and destructive and that the employer's desire to achieve
greater leverage in collective bargaining negotiations is insufficient to
outweigh the harm done to important employee rights.
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